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This dissertation explores the logic, methods, and outcomes of a U.S. government-
sponsored land reform in Lesotho, Southern Africa. The reform was part of a $363 million grant 
from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to the Kingdom of Lesotho that funded a sweeping 
change. Instead of local chiefs administering and allocating land, the power shifted to 
bureaucrats and landholders, who received leasehold titles to their land.  
In the first empirical chapter, I question the novelty of post-2000 development strategies, 
in particular the MCC and its ethos of ‘poverty reduction through economic growth.’ Using land 
as a lens, I explore recent eras of development assistance and ask if the Millennium-era has been 
appreciably different from pre-2000 development.  
In the second empirical chapter, I investigate the measurement, evaluation, and data 
usage of the MCC to argue that too short-term a measurement horizon can mask the true 
outcome of a development intervention. I argue that the agency's short assessment timeframe 
obscured the reality of the reform. When the MCC's five-year project in Lesotho, which 
explicitly targeted women's land access, ended in 2013, the land reform appeared to have been a 
success. However, only a year later, the reality looked much different in one village. Rather than 
having their land access secured or enhanced by the law, women in the village were being 
dispossessed by real estate developers, with the assistance of government bureaucrats. MCC's 
short-term data and measurement of outcomes, instead of the structures, mechanisms, and 
vulnerabilities that determine those outcomes, concealed a significant problem with the project. 
This illustrates both a problem with data-driven development projects, and a possible way to 
improve them. 
The third empirical chapter explores the role of maps and mapping in Lesotho's land 
reform. Maps are instrumental in the commodification of land and its exchange in markets. The 
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critical cartography literature emphasizes the “power of maps” to (re)define property relations 
through their descriptive and prescriptive attributes. But how do maps work to achieve these 
outcomes? This chapter examines the notion of maps as “inscription devices” that turn land into 
a commodity that can be bought and sold by investors. It is based on the analysis of a land 
reform project in the Southern African country of Lesotho. In contrast to the prescriptive notion 
of maps as inscription devices I argue that cadastral maps are better understood as processual. 
Maps are only powerful in concert with contingent social forces in changing political and 
economic contexts. I use the example of cadastral mapping and land sales in a peri-urban village 
in Lesotho to make the case for a more dynamic notion of maps and mapping in understanding 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since at least the early days of African independence, there have been strong linkages 
between wealthy countries' development agencies and poor countries' land tenure regimes. The 
1960s and 70s, which have been termed the "land reform decades" (Bassett 1993), were an era of 
reforms, often led by the World Bank, that moved tenure and allocation rights away from 
customary authorities and into the hands of central states and market exchange. Between the 
early 1980s and early 2000s, relatively few of these so-called "market led land reforms" [MLAR] 
(Wolford 2007) were instituted in African countries. MLAR are typified as an  
attempt to create or restore private rights to property for the purpose of improving 
the smooth functioning of rural markets (usually markets in land, credit and 
agricultural inputs) and increasing efficiency and production through security of title 
(Wolford 2007, 550; citing Borras jr. 2003; Deininger and Feder 1998; van Zyl, 
Kirsten and Binswanger 1996). 
 
The dearth of MLAR was both because of a change in development priorities, and because  
"most of the land policy reforms and titling programmes of the 1970s and early 1980s failed to 
achieve their stated aims, and were shown by a large body of social research to have been based 
on faulty premises" (Peters 2004, 274).  
 In Lesotho, an enclave country of two million surrounded entirely by South Africa, a 
development arm of the U.S. government, the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC], 
sponsored a MLAR that passed Parliament in 2010. The reform, which was codified by Land Act 
2010, moved allocation rights in urban areas from allocation papers alienable by village chiefs to 
freely exchangeable leasehold titles. This reform, and other modern MLARs, are predicated on a 
belief, advanced by Hernando de Soto, that secure and easily-exchangeable property rights are 
needed to vivify property and make it into circulating capital (de Soto 2000).  
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Rather than just being a return to the "land reform decades," advocates of the MCC and 
similar development bodies claimed this was part of a new kind of development policy that 
focused on aid effectiveness, accountability and good governance. U.S. President George W. 
Bush pushed this novelty to the center when he announced the formation of the MCC, calling it 
"a new compact for global development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor 
nations alike." 
 This study investigates three interrelated elements of the MCC-sponsored land reform in 
Lesotho. First, to what degree was the MCC a new kind of development agency, especially in 
terms of land rights? Second, what was the role of maps and mapping in the project of rendering 
Lesotho's land investable? Third, who were the beneficiaries of the project and how were those 
benefits measured? 
 In this chapter, I will outline the motivations, methodologies and contributions of this 
dissertation. In the following section, I will explain the role of Lesotho as an object of 
development and scholarly research, then my own relationship to it.  
 
Research Motivations 
 My interest in Lesotho's status as a place of international development dates to 2003, 
when I began two years of service there as a Peace Corps volunteer. In my capacity as a small 
arm of the U.S.'s development strategy in Southern Africa, I became attuned to the large amounts 
of international funding that went into "developing" Lesotho. In 2012, the OECD estimated that 
upwards of $120 million in direct foreign aid went to Lesotho. This amount is not atypical for the 
country, and reflects the massive amounts of development funding that have flooded the country 
over the 50 years since independence. In spite of that money, Lesotho remains an extremely poor 
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country, with massive poverty and unemployment, and short life expectancy, due in part to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. These apparent limitations and shortcomings of development have been 
commented on by scholars for at least half of Lesotho's independence. A decade after Colin 
Murray (1981, 19) declared that "the history of 'development' projects in Lesotho is one of 
almost unremitting failure to achieve their objectives," James Ferguson (1994, 8) wrote that 
"[f]or the 'development' industry in Lesotho, 'failure' appears to be the norm." Still another author 
contends that soil-related Development projects in Lesotho have been largely predicated on 
incomplete and sometimes erroneous understandings of history and science (Showers 2005). 
 That backdrop, and the ambivalences I felt about my own small place in the 
interventionist project of developing Lesotho, informed my Master's degree project. For this 
project, A History of the Events Surrounding the Gun War in Lesotho, 1880-81, I focused on the 
relationships among the Anglican Church, the governments in London and Cape Town, and the 
Basotho king, Letsie I. My research findings demonstrated that the importance of Anglican 
missionaries in this era of Lesotho history has been overstated and the strategic agency of King 
Letsie has received too little credit. This work further stimulated my interest in researching 
relationships between outsiders and Basotho.  
 My continued interest in relationships between Basotho and outsiders continued after I 
received my M.A. in 2009, as did a growing awareness of the work of geographers and 
environmental historians. My reading of William Cronon showed me the importance of 
relationships (and sometimes imagined dualities) between nature and society, and relationships 
between the past and the present. Cronon led me to political ecology, which is the branch of 
human geography in which I have found an intellectual home.  
 
 4 
 Political ecology is a framework within human geography and other social sciences that 
links thinking about the environment and nature to "a broadly defined political economy" 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, 217). Much of the research conducted under the aegis of political 
ecology has focused on shifting land rights (from Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bassett 1988 to 
Ranganathan and Balazs 2015; Hall, et al. 2015). This dissertation conceptualizes political-
ecological relations in terms of access to, control, and management of natural resources, in this 
case land.. I focus on the relationships between political economy in Lesotho and land rights. My 
attention draws on political ecology's focus on multiscalar explanation to explore links among 
U.S. development discourse, land law in Lesotho, mapping, and gendered dispossession of land. 
This dissertation conceptualizes political-ecological relations in terms of access to, control, and 
management of natural resources, in this case land.  This project was inspired by a heated 
political debate in Lesotho that I followed from afar. In 2009, conversations about Land Act 2010 
(or the "Land Bill," as it was then still known) were contentious and often revolved around the 
outsized role that the U.S. was perceived to be taking in Lesotho's domestic affairs. The more I 
read about Land Act 2010 and the logics of the various players who worked to pass it, the more 
interested I became. In the course of studying the reform, my interest was informed and shaped 
by three distinct questions.  
 The first of these was simply "what is development?" Particularly in light of the fact that 
President Bush maintained that the Millennium Challenge Corporation was something new, I 
thought it was important to consider what degree of novelty there was in their development 
priorities and strategies. To this end, I considered the work of Dani Rodrik and Joseph Stiglitz, 
two mainstream economists who had both proclaimed the end of the "Washington Consensus," 
an era in which external donors compelled poor countries to pursue development policies which 
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removed power from the state and vested it in businesses and markets. However, I thought that 
both Rodrik and Stiglitz were unclear about the difference between the Consensus era and what 
came after. Using land reforms as a lens, I considered the current post-Washington Consensus 
era and whether there was a genuine change from the Washington Consensus to the modern day. 
 A second question that formed a basis of this study concerned the status of women in 
Lesotho. There is a range of opinions about women's position in Lesotho. While some call it a 
"surprisingly good place to be a woman" (Kenner and Friedman 2012), others point to the 
feminization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic or some women's "sense of relentless economic need, 
compounded by bearing primary responsibility for managing households and raising children" 
(Harrison, et al. 2013) to argue that women are not particularly well-off in Lesotho. Embedded in 
this are questions about measurement – different metrics will illustrate different realities. For 
example, in terms of literacy and educational attainment, women are much better off than men in 
Lesotho. But in terms of HIV incidence and prevalence, men appear in a superior position to 
women. Land Act 2010 was said by both the Government of Lesotho and the MCC to work 
toward the enhanced status of women vis-à-vis land rights. The MCC is a proudly data-driven 
organization, so I was interested to better understand what was captured by their measurements 
of women's land rights.  
 In order to institute Land Act 2010 in the urban area of Maseru, Lesotho's capital, the 
Land Administration Authority needed surveys of all 55,000 parcels of land in the city limits. 
Such an undertaking was once prohibitively expensive, and had been the cause of the failure of 
Land Act 2010's predecessor, Land Act 1979. The MCC funded these 55,000 surveys with $20 
million of grant money, obviating the largest stumbling block from three decades before. The 
culmination of this project has been a cadastral map and land register, which delineate the 
 
 6 
boundaries and ownership of land parcels in Maseru. The process of mapping Lesotho's land 
made me curious about the relationship between mapping and what Tania Li calls "rendering 
land investable" (2014). While this topic had been discussed before, notably by Li and by James 
C. Scott in Seeing Like a State, other dealings with the relationship between the commodification 
of land and mapping had not engaged with current debates in the cartographic theory literature. 
Works by Rob Kitchin and Matthew Dodge helped to illuminate the social, political, economic, 
and cultural forces at work in giving the cadastral map in Lesotho its power. 
 The above readings, many other readings, and pre-dissertation research conducted in 
2012 and 2013 informed the research questions that ultimately guided this research project. 
1. How novel are the land reforms driven by Millennium Challenge Corporation-style 
development in relation to earlier interventions? 
 
2. What role did processes and practices of mapping play in the project of rendering 
Lesotho's land investable? 
 
3. Was women's land access successfully, accurately and completely measured by the 




 This project is based on eight months of qualitative fieldwork in and around Maseru, the 
capital city of Lesotho, from January through August, 2014. In Maseru, I was able to conduct 
interviews and fieldwork trips with bureaucrats and elected officials from the Maseru City 
Council and the Land Administration Authority [LAA], as well as former MCC employees and 
contractors. An employee of the LAA furnished me with lease data and a GIS basemap of the 
city of Maseru. With these data and ArcGIS software, I was able to determine that there were, as 
of 2012, four villages within Maseru city limits where agricultural land accounted for more than 
25% of the village's area. My research assistant, Liteboho Tsoako, and I visited each of these 
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villages and made contact with the chiefs. Only one of them was receptive to us: the chief of Ha 
Mohapi [I have changed names and other identifying details to protect informant confidentiality]. 
We elected to make his village our research site.   
 We began our research time in the village by speaking with the chief, walking the 
boundaries of the village with him, and discussing his ideas about the village, its fields, and its 
residents. We then performed a census of the village, querying residents of the 211 households 
on their tenure in the village; wealth in money, land and livestock; household size; marital status; 
employment status and location of employment (Lesotho, South Africa, or elsewhere), receipt of 
remittances, and educational attainment. From this population, we drew a representative sample 
of 40 households, adult members of which we then asked questions in 60-90 minute semi-
structured interviews about land, gender, authority, and the increasing urbanization of their 
village. Husbands and wives were questioned separately, except in one household, where the 
husband would not allow his wife to be questioned (See appendix for a copy of the interview 
protocol.) One member of our sample, a 67-year-old woman who lived alone, passed away 
between the time that we conducted the census and planned to interview her. We replaced her 
with another interviewee, a 74-year-old woman who lived alone and who was in the same 
quartile on wealth and remittances as the deceased woman.  
 At the conclusion of our interviews in Ha Mohapi, the interviews there had made clear 
that we needed to gather more data about the purchases of agricultural land that had recently 
happened there. I was able to interview several elected members of the Maseru City Council, 
including the current and former representative of Ha Mohapi, and four bureaucrats who work 
for the Council. I also attended two of their official meetings and accompanied them on a site 
visit to view the planned housing and golf course developments in Ha Mohapi. Finally, I was 
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able to meet with the lead investors in the housing development and the golf course 
development. At the completion of the fieldwork, I met with the chief of Ha Mohapi to discuss 
my preliminary research findings and ask for his thoughts on them. 
 Upon my return to the U.S., I spent several months reviewing, analyzing, and assembling 
the data I collected in Lesotho. I subsequently identified important themes, reassessed literature 
gaps, and then wrote the chapters in this volume. 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 This dissertation makes three contributions of note to the human geography literature. 
Through detailed qualitative fieldwork in Ha Mohapi, I demonstrate that the so-called "post-
Washington Consensus" that scholars from the right (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011) and the left 
(Stiglitz 2008) have attempted to define is not substantially different from the Washington 
Consensus. The case of Lesotho indicates that the same premises that underpinned Washington 
Consensus-era land reforms supported Lesotho's land reform. The specific case of Ha Mohapi 
indicates that the outcomes appear distressingly similar. In addition, the chapter contributes to 
current conversations about accumulation by dispossession, arguing that it is neither an 
economic or extra-economic process, but an amalgam of both. 
 A second contribution is to the critical cartography literature (sometimes called 
cartographic theory). To this I provide a demonstration of how maps are mobilized, and how 
their power is not inherent. Instead, the power of a map is constructed by political-economic 
forces and constantly shifting. In this way, the cadastral map is not merely a static "inscription 
device," as some scholars have claimed (Scott 1998, Wood and Fels 2008, Li 2014). The map is 
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dynamic, and its meaning is constantly shifting – it is "ontologically insecure" (Kitchin and 
Dodge 2007) and its power only comes from the ways it is constructed, understood, and utilized.  
 Third, this study is an addition to work on measurement and development, particularly in 
terms of gender. Evidence from Ha Mohapi makes a compelling case that even a data-driven 
development organization like the MCC can make substantial errors in their monitoring and 
evaluation. Despite the stated aim of mitigating women's vulnerability to land dispossession in 
Maseru, Land Act 2010 appears to have exacerbated this vulnerability in Ha Mohapi. MCC's 
data, however, are too short-sighted and do not reflect this reality, and instead illustrate a positive 
story from Ha Mohapi.  
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 The three chapters that follow this introduction address the research questions raised 
above. Each chapter includes a literature review, specific arguments, empirical data, and 
contributions. Chapter 2 explores what I call "development by dispossession," which I argue 
demonstrates commonalities between Washington Consensus and "post"-Washington Consensus 
development strategies. In Chapter 3, I engage with questions of measurement, gender, and land. 
In this chapter, I explore the time-scale of measurement by the MCC in Lesotho, and argue that it 
blinded the agency to the gendered dispossession that its project helped foment. The fourth 
chapter investigates the role of maps in making land in Maseru into a commodity. Here I show 
that mapping, a process, rather than a static map, was the tool that rendered land investable. 
Finally, Chapter 5 is a conclusion that summarizes the main arguments presented in the 





DEVELOPMENT BY DISPOSSESSION: THE POST-2000 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
AND LAND RIGHTS IN LESOTHO 
 
Introduction 
When President George W. Bush announced plans for the Millennium Challenge 
Account in 2002, he called for "a new compact for global development, defined by new 
accountability for both rich and poor nations alike. Greater contributions from developed nations 
must be linked to greater responsibility from developing nations." Since that announcement, 
which presaged the 2004 formation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC], it has 
repeatedly been claimed that this is part of a new era in international Development1. 
A main focus of the MCC's development initiatives over the past decade of existence 
centers on land rights. Over half of the MCC's development compacts (their name for formal 
agreements with recipient states) have included investments in property rights and land policy. 
Lesotho, in Southern Africa, was the beneficiary of a $363 million grant, with $20 million 
devoted to the enactment of a new land law, Land Act 2010. The law was designed to shift land 
allocation rights from customary authorities to a public land administration authority that was 
charged with issuing leasehold titles. The results of that U.S.-financed reform are illustrative of 
the continuities from the pre-2000 Development era to the present. This is apparent both in the 
ideas about economic growth and poverty reduction that anchor both era's land policies, and in 
the outcomes for poor and vulnerable people whose social relationships have been altered by 
                                                           
1 I consistently capitalize the word "Development" when referring to external interventions in the name of 
improvement, following Gillian Hart's distinction between "big D" Development and "little d" development: 'big D' 
Development defined as a post-second world war project of intervention in the 'third world' that emerged in the 
context of decolonization and the cold war, and 'little d' development or the development of capitalism as a 
geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes" (Hart 2001, 650). In cases where the 
usage is ambiguous, I have stuck to the "little d" 
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land reforms. Debates over land are part and parcel of the debates over international 
Development. This paper looks into recent eras of Development interventions with particular 
attention to land-focused interventions. It attempts to determine whether the MCC and its 
brethren are truly a "new compact for global development." 
 In this chapter, I argue that the type of development favored by the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation is not as novel as George W. Bush claimed. Instead, it fits into a 
consistent history of Development that, since at least 1981, has privileged economic growth 
ahead of poverty reduction with results that have often harmed those in poverty. I argue that part 
of what the MCC has done is paved the way for dispossession in places like Ha Mohapi2, a peri-
urban village on the outskirts of Maseru, Lesotho. An MCC Development project in Lesotho 
helped to create an economic reality that led to the dispossession of several vulnerable 
households of their agricultural fields. With the threat of eminent domain laws in Ha Mohapi, 
residents felt compelled to sell their fields for a price far below the perceived market value. The 
phenomenon of international Development paving the way for dispossession, which (borrowing 
from David Harvey) I term "Development by dispossession," was enabled by a Selected 
Development Area designation and a land reform, but it was the MCC's entry into Lesotho that 
provoked the rapid land seizures in Ha Mohapi. This paper draws on previous literature on 
development, land rights, and special economic zones to argue that there are few substantive 
changes within the so-called "new compact" for international Development.  
One significant change is that the MCC views land as a place of production, but not 
necessarily agricultural production. That is a marked break with the past's focus on increased 
crop yields by Development agencies. This change, which amounts to an alteration of fields' 
                                                           
2 Names and other identifying details have been changed 
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zoning from agricultural to commercial, can make land more valuable and investable as non-
agricultural land. Thus the longtime users of the land, who saw it as a place of subsistence 
agriculture, are no longer those who can benefit from the land. The relatively easy land seizures 
in Ha Mohapi were performed by real estate developers with the assistance of state bureaucrats 
and enabled by a changing policy environment. One element of that environment is the 1998 
declaration of Ha Mohapi as part of a "Selected Development Area." Another is the passage of 
the Land Act 2010 and the modification of how urban and peri-urban land is held, exchanged, 
and commodified in Lesotho. Land Act 2010 passed almost entirely because of support from the 
U.S. government, as $20 million of Development funding was at stake. 
A particular understanding of the meaning of "Development" made Ha Mohapi a place 
where land sales were likely. The additional classification of Ha Mohapi as a Selected 
Development Area, together with the assistance of state bureaucrats, made it a place where those 
sales would be far below market value3 and tantamount to dispossession. This is Development by 
dispossession, the concatenation of a policy environment and a Development environment that 
view all economic growth as good for poverty reduction. 
 
The Eras of International Development 
The McNamara Era: Development as Poverty Reduction 
 
Since in the 1970s, poverty alleviation has been a primary goal of large-scale 
Development projects. Robert McNamara's term as President of the World Bank defined 
Development objectives that included ameliorating "absolute poverty" and fulfilling people's 
                                                           
3 Most residents, real estate agents, and bureaucrats indicated that a fair market price would be approximately three 
times the price offered.  
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basic needs (McNamara 1973). McNamara's vision was the beginning of a framework that put 
poor people and "basic human necessities" at the forefront of Development. According to his 
vision, laid out in a speech in Nairobi in 1973, the objects of Development were poor people, 
specifically the rural poor. The goal of helping these poor people meet their basic needs was by 
increasing agricultural production; larger agricultural yields would give them more to eat and 
more surplus to sell. The aims were lofty, with McNamara defining them like this:  
 
We should strive to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of this century. That means 
in practice the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the reduction of infant 
mortality, and the raising of life-expectancy standards to those of the developed 
nations. Essential to the accomplishment of this objective is an increase in the 
productivity of small-scale agriculture (McNamara 1973).  
 
Poverty, however, would soon fall from the front of the Development agenda, replaced 
by what has been called "the rise and consolidation of neoliberal development and the rise of the 
Washington Consensus" (Watts 2013). A World Bank report is demonstrative of that rise. Titled 
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was published in 1981 the same year 
McNamara left the Bank. It is often called the Berg Report, after Elliot Berg, the economist and 
lead author. The Berg Report moved the locus of development away from poor people and onto 
poor countries. Rather than increasing farmers' agricultural yields, the goal was now much more 
expansive: to pull whole countries out of poverty by  
 
removing barriers to competition and real market prices, removing state subsidies 
and reducing state economic intervention in general, stimulating export production 
by relying on natural comparative advantages, reforming overvalued exchange 
rates that protect inefficient import substituting industries, and rationalizing the 
administrative, data gathering, planning and strategic functions performed by 
African governments (Lubeck 1992).  
 
The Berg Report itself heralded a new era in international development, one dominated by a 
neoclassical economics that identified markets as the objects of Development, rather than poor 
people. This was also true of its relationship to land. The formalization and clarification of land 
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rights in poor countries have been advocated by global North states for generations (Lipton 
2009). These formalizations have made land legible to external colonizers and developers. They 
have also clarified matters of authority, by empowering so-called "traditional authorities" (Berry 
1993, Mamdani 1996) and elected local officials (Ribot, et al. 2006).  
 The 1960s and 70s were a time of newfound independence in sub-Saharan Africa and a 
scramble between the US and USSR to gain the new states' alignment. Large-scale land reforms 
were largely sponsored by US-aligned powers and reflective of their capitalist ethos. The reforms 
implemented in that era "were all based on the premise that 'customary' systems did not provide 
the necessary 'security' to ensure agricultural investment and productive use of land" (Peters 
2004, 273). Reforms in this era were widespread. New leaders of new states saw the reforms and 
the cash infusions they provided as ways of cementing their fledgling leadership and were often 
happy to welcome reforms from Development agencies (Mamdani 1996). Following 
McNamara's 1973 World Bank speech, the reforms often aimed to increase the yields and 
productivity of smallholder farms. The reforms themselves demonstrated that land registration 
and titling were insufficient to provide increased agricultural investment, increased productivity, 
and poverty reduction (Rodrik 2000). As early as 1976, researchers were critical of the belief that 
clarified land rights would lead to improved productivity and mindful of the fact that formal land 
rights "frequently exacerbated conflicts and patterns of unequal access to land based on gender, 
age, ethnicity and class" (Peters 2004, 274, citing Okoth-Ogendo 1976; Coldham 1978; Pala 
1980; Davison 1988; Shipton 1988; Haugerud 1989; Attwood 1990; Shipton and Goheen 1992, 
316; Shipton 1994, 364–5; Besteman 1994, 1996). It became clear in this era that these World 
Bank-style interventions could serve to make tenure less secure, the exact opposite of its stated 
goals (Bassett 1993b).  
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The Washington Consensus Era: Development as Economic Growth 
 Large-scale international Development since the Berg Report reflected what John 
Williamson termed the "Washington Consensus." The Consensus has come to mean an ethos that 
encourages or compels poorer states to "get your macro balances in order, take the state out of 
business, [and] give markets free rein"4 (Rodrik 2006, 973).  
The Development apparatus of the Consensus was characterized by large-scale economic 
reforms in exchange for Development dollars. These reforms, under the umbrella of "Structural 
Adjustment Programs" (SAPs), were macroeconomic policy changes on which Development 
loans hinged. If all of these so-called "conditionalities" were not undertaken by a state, the IMF, 
World Bank or other major funding agency would not make a loan. Reforms centered on 
improving efficiency of markets, rather than directly addressing poverty. 
 In terms of poverty reduction and substantive economic growth for the world's poorest 
countries, the policies enacted via the Washington Consensus largely failed (Held 2013, Rodrik 
2006, Stiglitz 2008). This, though, is not a complete picture. Development money was also 
targeted at containing communist (and then post-Soviet) threats, and at opening poor countries' 
markets to transnational companies. Still, the dual problems of poor countries and poor people 
within those countries had not been ameliorated by the neo-liberal reforms promoted by the 
Washington Consensus; some argued the policies privileged by adherence to the Consensus had 
even exacerbated the problems (former World Bank chief economist Joseph E. Stiglitz [2003] is 
the highest profile example). Around the millennial year 2000, a new type of Development 
thinking began to take hold.  
                                                           
4 This was termed differently by Williamson (2002), who said he had identified the consensus as "macroeconomic 
discipline, a market economy, and openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI)." 
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The Washington Consensus was typified by the Berg Report, which shifted 
Development's land focus from a McNamara-era emphasis on smallholders to a larger, state-
level emphasis on markets. 
  
Above all, the Berg Report recommended prioritizing agriculture, both domestic 
and export-oriented, by allowing unmediated market mechanisms to operate, by 
funding rural infrastructure like roads, technical inputs, and small-scale irrigation 
technologies, and by eliminating the urban bias of large-scale government projects 
(Lubeck 1992, 522). 
 
 A key element of John Williamson's ten policy prescriptions with which he defined the 
Washington Consensus is secure property rights (Williamson 1990). With this framework behind 
it, land reforms in the era of structural adjustment were predicated on the same knowledges and 
beliefs as in the era before. The order of the day remained growth and ideas about how growth 
occurred continued to be seen through a modernization lens. That lens privileged the belief that 
poor states simply needed to "evolve" and "catch up" with more developed Western countries. 
The roles of SAPs and the interventions that accompanied them were intended to put poor 
countries on a trajectory to evolve toward the age of "high mass consumption" that had already 
been realized by the U.S. and other Western powers (Rostow 1960).  
 In terms of land rights, there was much similarity between the era of African 
independence (the McNamara era) and the era of SAPs (the Washington Consensus era). An 
important difference is in relation to authorities. The earlier era saw a minimization of chiefs' 
role in land rights regimes and customary authorities were largely sidelined. This shifted 
significantly in the 1990s, with the World Bank, DFID (the British aid agency), the UNDP and 
others changing their relationship to these authorities. This came after a long and troubling series 
of land reforms that failed to achieve substantive growth or poverty alleviation (Toulmin & Quan 
2000, Walker 2002, Peters 2004). Bringing additional actors, including chiefs, into the 
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conversation, reflected a somewhat simplistic picture of land rights and access. The failing of 
this was, as Peters put it, an "overly sanguine view of 'customary' systems" (Peters 2004, 276). 
However, despite these unkind words, titling reforms that incorporated or co-opted customary 
authorities and several scales of "local" institutions remained commonplace throughout the SAP 
era and into the PRSP era of today. Ultimately, a great deal of money, effort, legislation and time 
has been put into programs that work to title land. There is next to no evidence that they have 
been successful at two of their main stated aims in sub-Saharan Africa: increased agricultural 
productivity and access to credit markets (Lawry, et al. 2014).  
 
The PRSP Era: Development as Poverty Reduction, via Economic Growth 
Some scholars now argue that the Washington Consensus is dead. For Rodrik, "The 
question now is not whether the Washington Consensus is dead or alive; it is what will replace 
it" (Rodrik 2006, 974). The World Health Organization, among others, argues that the Consensus 
favored "top down" and "neo-liberal" approaches that did little to directly reduce poverty and 
needed to be changed. The loudest death knell sounded from France in 2005, where the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was drafted. The Paris Declaration was the culmination of a 
half-decade of movement toward a "post-Washington Consensus." This new consensus is the 
shift from open markets and strategic interests to poverty reduction. It encompasses George W. 
Bush's "new compact for global development," the Paris Declaration, the MDGs and the "make 
poverty history" campaign that culminated in significant debt reduction for poor countries. 
Importantly, this shift is embodied by "a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders 




That process – the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, or PRSP – is the new rubric for 
Development. The PRSP is an IMF and World Bank-developed procedure for identifying 
Development needs in a given poor country. The PRSP process, in which a team of experts from 
a poor state designs their country's poverty alleviation strategy, is part of a new type of 
Development, one ostensibly led by the recipient country.5 The degree to which this is truly led 
by the recipient is debated, with some accusing PRSPs of being an element of "one-size-fits-all 
development recipes stripped of any engagement with context or culture, politics, power or 
difference" (Cornwall and Brock 2005, 1059). A further review of 22 PRSPs noted that the same 
approaches often repeat themselves, demonstrating that  
  
All the PRSPs emphasise economic growth as the principal means to achieve the 
overall objective of reducing poverty. However, few elaborate policies for pro-
poor growth, although it is well known that ‘trickle-down’ approaches are 
inadequate. (Fukuda-Parr 2010).  
 
Despite the "well known" inadequacy of trickle-down, economic growth has remained the order 
of the day for development practitioners. Rumors of the demise of the Washington Consensus 
may well be premature. Rodrik and Stiglitz's perspective fails to note that many elements of the 
Consensus – namely the "trickle down" policies mentioned above – are alive and well. 
Macroeconomic reforms, a limited state role in business regulation and open markets are still the 
Development orders of the day. Conditionalities, while no longer under the guise of structural 
adjustment, live on in new forms.  
                                                           
5 These five "core principles" are that PSRPs should be: 
• "Country-driven, promoting national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil 
society; 
• "Result-oriented and focused on outcomes that will benefit the poor; 
• "Comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty; 
• "Partnership-oriented, involving coordinated participation of development partners (government, domestic 
stakeholders, and external donors); and 
• "Based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction" (http://www.imf.org).  
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 A main criticism of PRSPs is that they are simply conditionalities under another name. 
Critics accuse them of being process-driven conditionalities, rather than content-driven ones 
(Dijkstra 2011). Others say that the idea of local ownership is lacking in practice. "The call by 
the international donor community for national ‘ownership’ of PRSPs usually implies that 
national stakeholders are encouraged to agree with a pre-determined set of external policy 
recommendations" (McKinley 2008, 95). The outcomes are distressingly similar to those of 
structural adjustment:  
Donors and in particular the World Bank engage in 'business as usual' in their 
programme loans, implying that they attach many detailed policy conditions to 
budget support, making a fool of the ownership idea. All this means that aid 
effectiveness has not increased as a result of PRSPs (Dijkstra 2011, 5130).  
 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation: "Poverty Reduction Through Economic Growth"  
 Today's new era in Development, which I term the "PRSP era," has been criticized as 
providing one-size-fits-all solutions. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, an annual $1.2 
billion US government Development agency, would argue that such criticism is ill-suited to it. 
Good governance and proper macroeconomic policies are drivers of growth, goes the mantra of 
the MCC (Burnside and Dollar 2000). Growth is the engine of poverty reduction. Thus the MCC 
uses indicators of good governance and proper macroeconomic policies to determine eligibility 
for grants. Their vision is worth quoting in detail: 
MCC is advancing American values and interests by reducing global poverty 
through economic growth. The MCC model fulfills this mission by focusing on 
policy reforms, economic growth opportunities that deliver tangible results and 
shared learning on what is and is not working. This approach makes 
development assistance more effective, improves the lives of the world’s poor 
and creates the markets of the future, with whom companies can do business and 
trade (http://www.mcc.gov).  
 
Like PSRPs, MCC claims that their development objectives are "country-led," meaning that 
"Development investments are more effective and sustainable when they reflect countries’ own 
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priorities and strengthen governments’ accountability to its citizens" (http://www.mcc.gov). In 
practice, true bottom-up planning appears unlikely, as similar language appears in the property 
rights and land policy sections of MCC's compacts with Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Mongolia, 
and preliminary grants to Niger and Liberia. More likely, in another echo of PRSPs, similar 
cadres of contractors, agencies and consultants work with several countries to determine just 
what "country-led" Development the MCC is likely to fund. 
 The conditions that the data-driven MCC puts on potential recipient countries range from 
openness of markets to macroeconomic policies to various measures of "good governance." (See 
Table 2.1.) It is hard to dismiss the echoes of the Washington Consensus and its conditionalities 
in these indicators. In this light, critics have argued that the MCC is an echo of the past. 
The imperial hubris, the inflated fear and construction of the ‘Other’, US 
exceptionalism, unilateralism, and a willingness to use military and economic 
means to pacify, control and exploit sovereign countries all have a long American 
history, under both Democrat and Republican regimes (Bacevich, 2002; Kaplan 
2002). The analysis of the MCA [synonymous with MCC] presented here also 
points to more continuity than change (Mawdsley 2007, 503).  
 
While Mawdsley is more polemical than many analysts, her point resonates: President Bush's so-
called "new compact" greatly resembles the old consensus. Even the novel contribution of the 
MCC (and the entire PRSP era) to Development, a focus on "good governance," has been called 
"somewhat arbitrary" and accused of resulting in "a distorted and only ostensibly transparent 







Table 2.1: The MCC's 17 indicators, as of 2015 
 
Finally, the MCC's indicators (see Table 2.1 for a complete list) have been called new 
types of conditionalities and "redolent of the 'bare knuckle' neoliberalism that devastated sub-
Saharan Africa, Russia and parts of Latin America over the 1980s and early 1990s" (Mawdsley 
2007, 489). Unlike with SAPs, these conditionalities are ex ante, in that a country must achieve a 
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meaningful (but ambiguous) score relative to its poverty cohort. Rather than IMF-style 
conditionalities, which must be instituted as part of a loan process, MCC's indicators must be met 
before a grant is awarded. That said, they are still conditionalities; rules that enforce certain 
kinds of economic, political and social policies in recipient states (Stewart and Wang 2003; 
McKinley 2008). The differences between the two styles of conditionality are minimal. 
 African land reforms have traditionally addressed questions of agrarianism and 
agricultural production. That is to say that they have focused on increasing yields and 
productivity of a given piece of land, rather than altering the use of that piece of land. An 
agricultural field is expected to remain an agricultural field, even if a land reform privileges a 
different owner or user of the land. Arguments in favor of clarified land rights have generally 
focused on increased agricultural production, for enhanced subsistence outcomes and sale (Berry 
1984, Okoth-Ogendo 1989, Deininger & Binswanger 1999, Place 2009). Economic arguments 
for land reform have traditionally been situated in two policy camps: 
1. Those which regard land reform as necessary to enhance agricultural 
productivity as a basis for economic growth…. 
 
2. Those which emphasise the importance of land in supporting what are 
commonly termed the multiple livelihoods strategies of the poor (Walker 2002).  
 
There is a difference in the MCC's Property Rights and Land Policy (PRLP) approach versus 
previous approaches. The MCC adds a third and non-agricultural element to these camps: land is 
a "property asset" in MCC's formulation. That is to say that the agricultural value of a parcel of 
land may not be consequential, but its real estate value may be. The trickle down reality of their 
motto, "poverty reduction through economic growth" is abundantly clear here: "A well-
functioning PRLP system can not only help the poor, but can help investors and companies 




This view of land as a not-necessarily-agricultural asset is a crucial change in land rights 
interventions in the PRSP era. It is widespread throughout the MCC's development agenda, with 
Lesotho, Liberia, and Niger among the several countries where MCC has presented an idea of 
land's non-agricultural contribution to economic growth. There have been few changes in the 
underpinnings of the logic behind land-focused Development interventions in the last half-
century. However, the MCC's logic is entirely new; rural land in peri-urban areas is no longer 
solely a place of agrarian production, but a place of economic growth. The growth created by 
secure land tenure does not need to be agricultural. Policy reforms focused on growth could 
include increasing agricultural production, but they could just as easily privilege development of 
housing, commercial or industrial space on land once used for housing and smallholder 
agriculture. Policy interventions that focus on increasing value of land rarely lead to positive 
outcomes for smallholders who previously occupied and used that land (Verma 2014). This is 
perhaps the most notable change brought on by MCC-styled land Development policies: the 
distinctions between international Development and real estate development have further 
narrowed.  
 A second new element of the PRSP era is Development's relationship to land allocating 
authorities. A rhetorical valorization of chiefs was a major element of the Washington Consensus 
era – customary authorities were "stakeholders" who had an important role to play in local 
matters of land allocation and adjudication. In the PRSP era, chiefs are more likely to be seen as 
threats to democratic processes. Rather than empowering chiefs, who are potentially capricious, 
decentralized locally elected officials are the ones who should be empowered, goes this logic. 
This reasoning is not always based on evidence (see Mphale, et al. 2002), but is a compelling one 
that underpins a substantial amount of international development with regard to land. 
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In short, there is a resemblance between current PRSP-driven Development and the eras 
that came before it. While the Washington Consensus may no longer rule international 
Development, the focus remains on "macroeconomic discipline, a market economy, and 
openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI)" (Williamson 2002). These, after all, 
are the focus of the MCC's "indicators." The new eras have broadened the number of actors in 
whose name Development is practiced, but the logics underpinning it have remained rooted in 
the language of economic growth. Even today, the MCC trumpets itself as a provider of poverty 
reduction that stems from economic growth. The mechanism of "trickle down" that links the two 
is never fully articulated. Economic growth, then, is the focus of the MCC's interventions and 
"poverty reduction is at best a derivative outcome, for which no specific provision or planning is 
needed" (Mawdsley 2007, 502). The seventeen indicators shown in Table 2.1 are what the MCC 
considers necessary conditions for the economic growth that leads to poverty reduction. 
The new era of Development, led by PRSPs and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
is novel in some regards, but it also bears a great deal of similarity to the recent eras of 
Development that came before it. This is evident through its dealings with land, particularly 





Dates of Era 
Name of 
Era 





Relationship of Development to Land 





Reforms should redistribute land from states to 
users 
Land rights should be made secure to allow for 
increased agricultural production 
Main focus should be agricultural productivity 
1981 - 2000 Washington 
Consensus  
Underdeveloped 
State or Market 




Reforms should redistribute land from less-
productive users to more-productive users 
Land rights should be made secure to allow 
access to credit markets and to increase 
agricultural production 
Main focus should be agricultural productivity 
2000 -
present 










Reforms should redistribute land from less-
productive users to more-productive users 
Land rights should be made secure to allow 
access to credit markets 
Land productivity still focus, but "production" 
not exclusively agricultural  
 
Table 2.2: Recent Eras of International Development's Relationship to Land 
  
 
Special Economic Zones & "Land Grabs" 
Land development has, in recent years, seen a substantial rise of Special Economic 
Zones, or SEZs. SEZs are specific areas that a state sets aside for a certain type of zoning and 
development, either by legislation or executive order (Farole & Akinci 2011). This can include 
export procession zones, foreign trade zones, etc. In Lesotho, the term used is "Selected 
Development Area," which refers to planned commercial development. One of the merits of 
SEZs is that they are typically more economically liberal than the rest of a given country (Farole 
& Akinci 2011). In order to gain the large amounts of land that must be utilized for commercial 
development, eminent domain laws are often utilized in order to remove less economically 
productive users from the land. In India, for example, hundreds of SEZs have laid claim to 
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hundreds of thousands of acres of land; the seizures of land via eminent domain-styled laws have 
been theorized as a form of "accumulation by dispossession" [ABD] (Levien 2012, Harvey 
2003). David Harvey's conceptualization of accumulation by dispossession is an interpretation of 
Marx's "primitive accumulation" situated to late capitalism, rather than the beginnings of a 
capitalist transition. Harvey describes the process as the seizure of a commodity, generally with 
the assistance of or by the order of the state: "taking land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a 
resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized 
mainstream of capital accumulation" (Harvey 2003, 149). Importantly, Levien complicates 
Harvey's explicitly economic argument by asserting that ABD is the sale or transfer of a 
commodity that is not easily obtained on open markets; the state uses "extra-economic" power to 
commodify it (Levien 2012). In the case of many SEZs, the focus falls less on the 
proletarianization processes of making former peasants into landless laborers and more on 
making the land more economically productive than it is under peasant control. The 
"accumulation" is less an accumulation of cheap labor than of land or capital, especially in places 
like Maseru, Lesotho, where the Bureau of Statistics estimates unemployment at 50%.  
Calling ABD an exclusively economic or extra-economic process is too simplistic. Such 
assertions are made at the expense of the other view, while the two can comfortably co-exist. In 
an era of global capitalism, distinguishing a process that is only economic from one that is only 
extra-economic is increasingly complex, and the distinction between the two is easily muddied. 
ABD is best understood as the concatenation of a series of factors, as outlined by Springer 
(2013). ABD is a system in which common property rights are turned into exclusive rights via 
land privatization. Peasants are then removed from the land, and their labor is commodified. In 
addition, the natural resources on the land are appropriated by the state or private sector. ABD 
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takes on many forms, often beyond Marx's simplistic view of primitive accumulation as a 
building block of capitalism. As Levien, Harvey, Springer and many others have demonstrated, 
the many forms of ABD typify capitalism, "even in its most 'mature' forms" (Glassman 2006, 
617). Critically, the heterogeneity of the forms of ABD means that there are a broad variety of 
struggles against ABD. Rather than a positive, Harvey argues that this leads to an atomized 
struggle against ABD, where protests are not effectively linked to one another, and it can be 
"hard to even imagine connections between them" (Harvey 2003, 166).   
 Finally it is important here to bring up a contested and complicated term that has been 
heavily used by scholars, journalists, and Development practitioners: "land grab." While land 
grab is a felicitous term, it is hardly a novel concept. Land has been expropriated (or "grabbed") 
for generations, both by those close to the dispossessed and by outsiders. The current rhetorical 
vogue of "land grabs" focuses on the origins and scale of the capital that dispossesses people of 
their land; it does not illuminate a phenomenon that is novel (Verma 2014, Levien 2012). In 
addition, important geographical questions are elided in this formulation: the questions Why 
here? and Why now? are rarely asked. 
 
Evidence from Peri-Urban Maseru, Lesotho 
Lesotho's Land Act 2010 was written largely by consultants from outside Lesotho. It 
bears strong resemblances to the never-passed Land Bills of 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2008. The Act 
finally passed in 2009 with the MCC making clear that $20 million of the larger grant was 
contingent on the Act's passage. The American country director in Maseru, Gene MacDonald, 
was quoted in one newspaper as saying "if the Land Bill 2009 will not have been passed by 17 
September 2013, the MCC will have no choice but to withdraw the five percent, or 
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approximately US$20.5 million of the grant, meant specifically for land reform administration in 
Lesotho" (Lesotho Times 2009). Classified U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks make 
clear that the Land Bill was a volatile political issue; it passed behind the largely tacit support of 
the ruling party and the business community in Maseru (Wikileaks.org). 
The Land Act 2010 is plainly consistent with the MCC's conception of development. The 
ethos of "poverty reduction through economic growth" is echoed by the words of the government 
minister tasked with executing the law, shortly after the Act's passage. "The current land reform 
program in Lesotho is driven by the desire to achieve social growth and development on the one 
hand and economic growth and development on the other" (Sekatle 2010). As in the earlier 
section about the MCC's new logic of land, a key difference between Land Act 2010 and 
previous reforms is that this one was not based around ideas of agricultural production. Instead, 
this was predicated on an economic growth that came from non-agricultural sectors. In effect, 
these arguments served to legitimate accumulation by dispossession, both to Basotho and to 
outsiders. This legitimacy is conferred by laws, by mapping practices, and by enforcement 
(Springer 2003). To that, I would add that it is rendered legitimate through development agencies 
presenting themselves as civilization: "Law and civilization further the legitimization of 
accumulation by dispossession, and wherever they are performed, violence is enacted through 
the state of exception, exposing us all to bare life" (Springer 2003, 623).  
In Ha Mohapi, a village on the outskirts of Maseru, but within the state-defined urban 
area, the fruits of land reform came to the people. MCC funding brought surveyors to the village 
for free and, after confirming who inhabited each surveyed plot, brought leases to the owners. 
This obviated the main shortcoming of the previous 1979 law that prevented it from being 
widely observed. Rather than relying on landholders to come to the city center to register their 
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own parcels of land, the process was brought to the village. This is the procedure that has been 
used for 55,000 lease registrations, or over 92% of all leases registered in Maseru District. 
Through that process, a nearly complete land registry and cadastral map of Maseru has been 
created for Maseru's 138 square kilometers. 
Two major real estate developments are taking place in Ha Mohapi, on what was, until 
recently, the agricultural lands of the village's longtime residents. The field holders typically 
used their land for maize cultivation, occasionally with another grain or vegetables. In most 
households, upwards of 90% of the food grown was for household consumption, but in good 
years, most households had at least some surplus they were able to sell. On one side of the road, 
residents have sold their fields to a real estate developer who has begun construction of what will 
eventually be a 700-home suburban development. On the other side of that road, residents have 
sold their fields to a golf course developer. While outsiders provide much of the capital for the 
projects – Indians provided much of the first round of investment for the housing development 
and South Africans for the golf course – the leaders of the projects are Basotho. 
 On its face, this story is potentially a positive one. As the margins of Maseru urbanize, 
the long-term residents discover that they are valuable as labor and can receive a large amount of 
money in exchange for the sale of their fields to entrepreneurs. This could be an example of a 
"win-win" narrative of poverty reduction and economic growth favored by development agencies 
like the MCC, World Bank and others (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). According to that 
view, residents made a rational economic choice to maximize their own income and sell their 
land to those who could produce more value from that same piece of land. This is the vaunted 
"poverty reduction through economic growth" scenario that was promised by MCC. 
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 In reality, that simple slogan was not the whole story. Instead of a traditional "willing 
seller, willing buyer" transaction, this transaction came with pressure, threats and cajoling from 
both the real estate developers and unelected bureaucrats from the Maseru City Council – the 
masepala6. Residents of Ha Mohapi reported feeling intense pressure from both the developers 
and the masepala. Some reported that they were visited by representatives of the developers at 
times they found bizarre, like evenings and Sundays. Many residents said that they felt pressured 
to sell for a price below market value or else they feared having their land seized. Additionally, 
most of the residents with whom I spoke were unable to determine which individuals represented 
the masepala and which the developers. I told this to one of the visitors, a high-ranking unelected 
official from the masepala. His response was revealing: "if the people don't know if we come 
from the City Council or the real estate company, that is a good thing." One of the golf course 
developers said to me that dispossession with little-to-no compensation, with the assistance of 
the masepala, was a real possibility, but "we hope it doesn't come to that."  
 Several informants expressed to me their waning hope that, despite being effectively 
compelled to sell their land, something positive for the village would come of it. As it became 
clearer that the the people of Ha Mohapi would not benefit from suburban real estate or a golf 
course, 'Maneo, a lifelong resident who had sold two fields, told me that "there were many 
promises made to the owners of the fields that their fields are going to be used for huge 
developments that will benefit the village but nothing has happened for us yet." Her opinion 
illustrated the concern and resignation that were common among residents who sold their fields. 
                                                           
6 I use the Sesotho word "masepala," an English loan word for "municipality," intentionally here. Pronouncing the 
word a particular way makes it sound like a Sesotho profanity. I mention it here because informants in Ha Mohapi 
were exceedingly fond of that pronunciation, making clear that they felt the City Council was "shit." 
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 Ha Mohapi's residents are right to be concerned. Land Act 2010 allows for "expropriation 
and acquisition of land for the public interest" under sections 51 and 52. The standard for this is 
exceedingly low. Section 51(2) of the Land Act shows just how low: 
The following shall constitute circumstances under which land may be 
expropriated in the public interest –  
(a) setting aside land for the development of agriculture by modern farming 
techniques; 
(b) construction or development of a new residential, commercial or industrial 
area; or 
(c) development or reconstruction of existing built-up area. 
 
Additionally, Section 50(i) defines the "public interest" broadly, as "providing any service which 
is in the public interest or would enhance or promote national resources and prosperity." The 
housing and golf developments in Ha Mohapi certainly meet this standard; I was told by 
investors and bureaucrats that both the golf course and the housing development were in the 
"public interest." Further, the Minister of Local Government and Chieftainship, who is 
responsible for defining the "public interest" above has already defined Ha Mohapi as a place of 
development. The village has been set aside as a "Selected Development Area" (SDA) since 
1998. SDA is the legal terminology used in Lesotho for what amounts to a Special Economic 
Zone – for purposes of this article, they can be considered synonymous. Legally speaking, Ha 
Mohapi's status within an SDA means that the conditions from Section 51(2) have been met.  
In an SDA, the standard for expropriation of land is "unreasonableness." Section 52(a) 
notes that "the Government shall first negotiate with the holder of land rights which are the 
subject of potential expropriation and resort to expropriation only upon failure of the 
negotiations due to the unreasonableness of the holder of the rights to the land." The right to 
negotiate, to define what is "unreasonable" and, critically, to determine the value of an 
expropriated piece of land all fall to the Government of Lesotho, in the person of the Minister of 
Local Government and Chieftainship. Perhaps not surprisingly, the masepala is not autonomous: 
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it is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftainship. The majority of the 
masepala's budget is provided by the Ministry. Though Ha Mohapi's status as an SDA had been 
public knowledge for 14 years, developers' specific plans were not registered until after the 
execution of Land Act 2010. Mid-2012 was when the Maseru City Council first received 
proposals for development of the Ha Mohapi fields. Of the 11 households with whom I spoke 
who sold their fields, none was satisfied with the price they received. All felt pressured into 
selling and convinced that if they did not sell for a price that they felt to be far below market 
value, they would have their land seized. Two reported being told explicitly that their land would 
be seized without compensation if they did not agree to sell. 
It is clear that the developers took advantage of both a policy environment that allowed 
for easy dispossession and the provision of secure tenure. This scale of the purchases in Ha 
Mohapi (all of the agricultural fields), together with the widespread dissatisfaction of land sellers 
there, indicates that the land security created by Land Act 2010 may be a security for the wealthy 
rather than the poor. It serves as a demonstration of the gulf between "economic growth" and 
"poverty reduction" and the mechanisms that make well-capitalized corporations and individuals 
more able to benefit from secure land rights than the poor and vulnerable. 
The process of land allocation, by which the masepala formally decided to approve the 
real estate company's lease on Ha Mohapi's fields, is a simple one. Several elected local 
government officials went to examine the land in Ha Mohapi. They travelled in a masepala car, 
with masepala bureaucrats, and approved the allocation of the fields to the developer after 
consulting with two masepala bureaucrats and no one else. 
What is happening in Ha Mohapi can be read as yet another in a the ongoing "global land 
grab." (Wolford, et al. 2013). However, this is not just an example of a "land grab," at least as 
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that term is generally understood. Instead of a large-scale seizure of land by a well-capitalized 
foreign interest, Ha Mohapi's "grab" is happening on a small scale and largely being performed 
by local interests. These are local elites, both the developers and the masepala bureaucrats, who 
are making relatively small-scale investments. The results, though, are the same as if it were 
Cargill or Nestlé taking over the land: dispossession, relocation and potentially deepening 
poverty outcomes. Several informants told me that their lives had not improved since the sale of 
their fields. One said this: "It is becoming harder and harder to get good production as most of 
the fields are sold into housing sites. As more people are coming in, the more we lose land, from 
agriculture to settlements and sooner or later there will not be any fields left to use anymore." 
Her sentiments echoed those of many others, who also described what was lost in the conversion 
of the fields to non-agricultural uses. "Those fields are the source of our food. Without those 
fields our lives will be devastated, since there are no jobs for us to work and support ourselves." 
Notably, the small up front payment given by the real estate company had been taken by that 
informant's family members, who lived away from Ha Mohapi. That up front payment is another 
issue. Sellers were all given a (non-negotiable) price of 45 Maloti per square meter (about 4 US 
Dollars, in 2014), with a threat of 11 Maloti ($1), or potentially nothing, if they didn't sell 
immediately. Field sizes were small in Ha Mohapi: they ranged from approximately 0.55 
hectares to 1.9 hectares. At the M45 price, that meant that total sale figures ranged from 
M247,000 ($22,500) to M855,000 ($77,700), both considerable sums of money. However, the 
way the contracts are structured means that most of that money is years away from arriving. 
Only 5% of the compensation is paid up front. Forty percent is paid when the project is fully 
approved and capitalized (which had not happened as of late 2014), and 50% when the project is 
completed – 2017 at the earliest. The final 5% is never paid, instead used for "infrastructure 
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improvements" in the village. Villagers who sold fields are suspicious that they may never see 
more than the 5% they have already received, and my own conversations with the real estate 
developer have done little to assuage those fears. Given the most recent Lesotho Bureau of 
Statistics data, the amount that has been paid amounts to about 7.5 years of maize harvest value. 
This is not insubstantial, but informants told me that they now had to travel by taxi to Maseru to 
purchase maize meal, where it was sold at inflated prices. Most estimated that the 5% would last 
them no more than three years. Considering the woeful local labor market, it is difficult to see 
this as poverty reduction. 
The scale of what is happening in Ha Mohapi is different than a sweeping land grab, but 
the results are distressingly similar. The scale at which they occur, however, indicates that 
processes distinct from those of the "global land grab" may be at work in places like Ha Mohapi. 
While there is scholarly fascination with the "new," the "foreign" and the "large-scale," a focus 
on novelty and size can obscure smaller-scale dispossessions that, in total, may be on par with 
(or greater than) the new large-scale foreign global land grab (Verma 2014).  
 Phenomena like these smaller-scale seizures of land, which I term "everyday 
dispossessions," are understudied and underreported. In recent years, scholarship and popular 
media have focused heavily on major actors like multinational corporations (Daniel and Mittal 
2013) or major universities (Bergdolt and Mittal 2012). This ignores the fact that processes are 
different at alternate scales. Mindful of the fact that property is a social relationship, we can note, 
as James Ferguson did while speaking of Lesotho, that these social relationships are embedded 
within structures, which can vary widely from place to place. "Where the constellation of social 
forces is different, we may anticipate the possibility that property may be structured differently. 
Such is indeed the case in Lesotho" (Ferguson 1985, 652-653).  
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 There is a historically and spatially contingent structure of property in Lesotho. That 
structure dates back generations and includes the transition to independence, the relative failure 
of Land Act 1979 (Lawry 1993) and the changing eras of Development. The social relationships 
that govern property, economic growth and poverty reduction are different in Lesotho than 
anywhere else. The reforms spearheaded by Land Act 2010 attempt to fix a very specific kind of 
social relations in Lesotho, with only a small regard for the country's nuances. Land rights are 
not historically traded on markets in Lesotho: "legal 'ownership' is vested in the Basotho nation, 
and fields are not commodities" (Ferguson 1985, 653).  
 
Discussion: Development by Dispossession 
The historical and spatial contingencies that make certain times and certain places distinct 
from others are routinely elided in international Development circles. This is evident through the 
example of land reform in Ha Mohapi. Land in Lesotho is understood differently from 
elsewhere, and efforts to practice "one-size-fits-all" Development there are inadequate. This 
paper has demonstrated, with land and land reforms as a lens, that the current PRSP era looks 
quite a bit like the one before it. George W. Bush and many others in the Development 
community promised that the post-millennial era would be a new one, with substantial changes. 
Evidence from Lesotho indicates that little is different than before. 
One significant change in the new PRSP era of Development is that land is no longer 
viewed as solely a place to increase agricultural yields. Instead, it is a place of real estate 
development, speculation, and mixed use. This addresses a concern raised by James Ferguson, 
who saw "a troubling tendency, in all of these discussions, to reduce what we might call the land 
question (who has what rights to land, what do they do with it and with what implications) to the 
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agrarian question (how farming is, or ought to be, organized, and with what role for peasants or 
other small agricultural producers)" (Ferguson 2013, 166). It does not, however, obviate the 
question of what happens to the people dispossessed of their formerly agricultural land, like in 
Ha Mohapi. Their fate remains an open question. 
 The means by which people have been dispossessed of their land is clear. One of the 
main contributors to the relatively easy purchase of Ha Mohapi's fields is its designation as a 
Selected Development Area, aka a "Special Economic Zone." The very real threat of eminent 
domain (both imagined and literally threatened by state bureaucrats) drove people to sell their 
fields for well below market value. Often the residents did not desire to sell their fields for any 
price, but felt they had no choice. Evidence from Lesotho supports Levien's assertion that this is 
a form of "accumulation by dispossession." In effect, what has happened in Ha Mohapi is 




 The long-time residents of Ha Mohapi are now without agricultural fields. Their fields 
have been commodified and sold to developers, with only the thinnest amounts of participation 
from the people of the village. This article has demonstrated that this story of Development by 
dispossession is consistent with the philosophy of land and Development that informs the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation and the whole PRSP era of Development. Similarly, I have 
highlighted the consistencies between the PRSP era and the Washington Consensus before it by 
noting their similar understandings of economic growth and clarified land rights. 
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 The case of Ha Mohapi in Lesotho illustrates the gulf between some of the claims of the 
PRSP era and the realities. Rather than being led by Basotho, the passage and execution of Land 
Act 2010 were spearheaded by the MCC. Instead of chiefs ceding land authority to representative 
locally elected officials, the actual power has gone to masepala bureaucrats, who are unelected 
and may be even less representative than chiefs were. 
In Ha Mohapi, a project calculated to achieve economic growth is happening. However, it 
appears that poverty reduction is not. The positioning of economic growth ahead of poverty 
reduction is hardly new; that was a major element of the Washington Consensus. However, the 
PRSP era is filled with claims that it has finally combined the best of the poverty-focused 
McNamara era and the growth-focused Washington Consensus era. This article indicates that, in 
Lesotho, poverty reduction has taken a backseat to economic growth. 
Two important geographic questions that have not been fully addressed in this article are 
ripe for further research. Above, I said that the questions the Why here? and Why now? are rarely 
asked. These questions are important to those of land grabs, reforms, and dispossessions, but also 
of Special Economic Zones and Development projects. This article has brought a history of 
Development and land together with ongoing work on SEZs (Levien 2012, Levien 2013, Levien 
2015) to investigate large-scale questions of why and smaller scale ones of how.  
The story of why and how in Ha Mohapi is a story of the relationship between 
Development, as imagined by the MCC, and the very real dispossession of the village's former 
field owners. As in many other places, residents were dispossessed of their agricultural land by 
the combined forces of the state and capital. In Ha Mohapi, however, this was not a "land grab," 
at least not in the way the term is often used (Verma 2014). The small-scale compulsory 
purchases of land in Ha Mohapi were neither foreign nor large-scale. They were quotidian in 
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every sense, except for the involvement of the MCC. A focus on the novel, the foreign, and the 
large-scale can serve to obscure smaller-scale land deals, what might be termed "everyday 
dispossessions." The MCC's seemingly uncritical belief that economic growth necessarily leads 
to poverty reduction helped to empower the purchase of Ha Mohapi's fields. As I have shown 
above, that valorization of economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction. 
Instead, it can lead to harm for vulnerable households, in the form of dispossession. The 
phenomenon of Development by dispossession in Ha Mohapi is consistent with the way land, 




MEASURING GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND LAND: DATA-DRIVEN ANALYSIS 
AND LAND REFORM IN LESOTHO 
 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on a land reform in Lesotho, southern Africa, to explore theoretical 
concepts around development, land access, and measurement. The reform, which moved land 
allocation rights from traditional authorities to market exchange, was sponsored by the U.S. 
government's Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC]. The MCC, a U.S. government agency 
separate from USAID and the State Department, is an international development agency 
dedicated to "poverty reduction through economic growth." The MCC has demonstrated that it 
acknowledges "the critical role that land, natural resources and other property assets play in 
economic development" (MCC.gov), with at least 15 of its funded projects devoting money to 
land rights. This is substantial, accounting for a third of MCC's 45 partner countries. Among 
MCC's main foci is "data-driven" development.  
The MCC contributed $20 million to Lesotho's land reform. That funding was contingent 
on the passage and execution of Land Act 2010 by Lesotho's Parliament. That law was part of a 
number of other pieces of legislation that sought to "modernize" (MCC Compact) Lesotho's land 
tenure system. The land tenure system that existed prior to these laws allowed chiefs substantial 
power in determining the allocation of land. The MCC and Government of Lesotho (GoL) 
prioritized passage of these laws, in part because these chiefs were thought to sometimes be 
capricious in land matters.  
Women were a targeted demographic of this development intervention. Women's status 
in Lesotho is complex and changing. On one hand, a majority of primary school students in the 
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country are girls, and the World Economic Forum regularly ranks Lesotho highly on its Global 
Gender Gap report. On the other, married women were legally considered minors until 2006. 
The shape of labor and geography is also changing in Lesotho. Before 2000, a massive number 
of working-age men traveled to South Africa to work in that country's mining sector. Since the 
end of Apartheid rule in South Africa, that country's labor market has shrunk significantly to 
Lesotho citizens. At the same time, favorable U.S. trade policy has made Lesotho a hotbed of 
textile production. Several American clothing companies produce clothing in Taiwanese and 
Chinese-owned factories that employ 40,000 people, nearly all of them women (Rosenberg 
2007). Lesotho has a long history of gender politics vis-à-vis land access (Epprecht 2000, 
Eldredge 2007). In this paper, I explore the fortunes of women in one village in the context of a 
changing legal landscape. How has the altering of laws in Lesotho changed the land access of 
women in a peri-urban village and what does that say about the measurement techniques of the 
MCC and other development agencies? Further, what role has "data-driven" measurement had in 
determining access? 
 
Land, Gender, and Law in Lesotho 
 Recent legislation in Lesotho attempts to maintain and improve women's status there by 
securing their rights to land in the face of threats, both real and perceived. Three laws, sponsored 
and supported by the U.S. government and other donor states and agencies, are geared at 
improving women's legal status in Lesotho. Local Government Act 1997 (which took effect in 
2005) fully moves land allocation power from chiefs to elected committees. Legal Capacity of 
Married Persons Act 2006 bestows full citizenship and full property ownership rights on women, 
rather than subjugating them as minors to the will of husbands or fathers. In terms of land rights, 
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the legislation culminated in passage of Land Act 2010, which has been a major force in moving 
women's land rights from customary authorities – unelected village chiefs – to the open market.  
 Passage of Land Act 2010 came after a long series of conversations and contestations 
among Basotho politicians and people and external development agencies and scholars. Early 
drafts of the law were proposed in Parliament in 2001 and 2004, but neither passed. The 2010 
debate over the law that eventually did pass was contentious enough that the opposition walked 
out of Parliament, citing pressure from the U.S. to "bulldoze" the law through the assembly with 
a minimum of public consultation (Zihlangu 2010). Leaked diplomatic cables from the U.S. 
Embassy in Maseru reveal that there was little will in the ruling party to pass the law. Those 
cables indicate that it was largely that the U.S. made the $20mm of the MCC/Lesotho compact 
earmarked for land reform contingent on Land Act 2010's passage (Wikileaks 2009, 2010).  
An important reason given by both the MCC and the Lesotho government for the legal 
changes to the land regime in Lesotho was to extend more equitable and less capricious land 
rights to women than existed previously (Sekatle 2009). Before 2006, Basotho women were 
typically minors in the eyes of the law: "[B]efore marriage, women were children of their fathers, 
after marriage they were children of their husbands, and during their widowhood they were 
children of their heirs or sons" (Molapo, 1994, cited in Kalabamu 2006, 237). In this reality, 
women were effectively second class citizens. An earlier law, the Legal Capacity of Married 
Persons Act 2006 bestowed full citizenship and full property ownership rights on women, rather 
than subjugating them to the will of husbands or fathers. Land Act 2010 worked to bring 
Lesotho's land law into harmony with that law, as well as ensuring full inheritance rights for 
widows. Now that Land Act 2010 has afforded more equitable rights to women, the argument 
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backing these legal innovations suggests that women's status in Lesotho has been further 
strengthened and sustained. 
A second objective of the legal reforms related to the chieftaincy. Chiefs were said to be 
too powerful in terms of land distribution, allocation, and alienation, and were often thought to 
be working in their own self-interest, rather than the interests of their villagers (Quinlan and 
Wallis 2003, Morapeli 1990, Lawry 1993).7 Chiefs' power, which had steadily diminished since 
independence, was by 1979 largely based on land allocation rights. The entrepreneurial spirit of 
chiefs helped keep Land Act 1979 from being executed. Their widespread backdating of 
customary allocation papers (known as "Form Cs") to read 1978, even those they issued decades 
after 1978 (Leduka 2006, Leduka and Setsabi 2008), effectively undermined the 1979 law. The 
backdating of Form Cs was well-known and one of the main shortcomings of the pre-2010 land 
tenure system in Lesotho identified by outsiders (UN-HABITAT 2006).  
 Agarwal argues that women's ownership of land leads directly to improved social, 
economic and political outcomes for women (Agarwal 2001). But there is a distinction between 
the "bundle of rights" that has been afforded to women in places like Lesotho and the "bundle of 
powers" that allow women to benefit form these rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003); those powers 
are what will determine whether women truly benefit socially, economically and politically from 
land reforms. Leslie Gray and Michael Kevane wrote over a decade ago that "the trend is clear 
throughout the continent: women's rights to use land, gained through husbands or kin, are 
exposed as secondary and diminishing" (Gray and Kevane 1999, 33) Their research, however, 
pointed to ways that women were subverting their secondary and diminishing place. "These 
actions have enabled women to create new routes of access to land, and in some cases, new 
                                                           
7 See Drimie's work for an example of how what appears to be "capriciousness" by chiefs sometimes "provides a 
relatively secure means of livelihoods for the HIV/AIDS affected households" (Drimie 2002, 11). 
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rights" (Gray and Kevane 1999, 33). It is these "new routes" and "new rights," along with “new 
abilities,” that Lesotho's recent land reform claims to encourage, in the form of market-led land 
rights. 
  
The Role of Data in Development 
The MCC is a proudly data-driven organization. One of the organization's founding 
principles states: "data-driven analytical rigor and a focus on outcomes should govern resource 
allocation, project design, and results measurement" (mcc.gov). Sub-Saharan Africa often lacks 
robust data sets. However, this lack has not limited the conclusions that scholars have drawn 
from these data. Morten Jerven has, in two recent books (2013, 2015) demonstrated that Western 
development economists frequently use statistical models to fill the data gap. However, the data 
they use as input variables are notoriously unreliable, making the modeled results just as 
unreliable. Another scholar was less charitable in this regard, contending that "[m]uch of African 
econometrics is simply a vast exercise in garbage in, garbage out" (de Waal 2016).  
Similarly, data about women's land rights and land access are notoriously unreliable 
(Doss, et al. 2015). A team of agricultural economists say that the evidence is getting stronger, 
but remains incomplete: 
the evidence base on impact evaluations of land and property rights interventions 
has increased in recent years, [but] little evidence on the gender-differentiated 
impacts of land property rights interventions is based on longitudinal data or 
moves beyond simple associations (Doss, et al. 2015) 
 
That increasing evidence base is a good thing, but there is a very real concern that the evidence 
collected on this topic privileges "new rights" ahead of "new abilities." I will explore this 
distinction in further detail below.  
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 The metrics of poverty and development in sub-Saharan Africa are limited, and must 
often be gathered (or modeled) by agencies. The ways these phenomena are measured is built on 
"fundamental assumptions as to [poverty's] nature and causes" (Lok-Dessallien 1999, 10), but 
those assumptions are then built in to the measurements, as the intensely political and contested 
assumptions are depoliticized and "rendered technical" (Li 2005).  
 The measurement and rendering technical of a development intervention's outcomes can 
be a way of reinforcing the value and necessity of development interventions. As David Mosse 
phrased it, "development projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas (as 
systems of representations) as well as operational systems" (Mosse 2005, 17). Mosse argued that 
how a development intervention is monitored and evaluated is as important to its outcomes as 
what it is measuring. To these, I add a third, which goes largely unmentioned by Mosse: when 
the measurement of a development intervention happens and success or failure is declared, is as 
vital and important as how and what to the projects of poverty alleviation and to maintaining 
those projects as "coherent policy ideas" and "operational systems." (Mosse 2005).  
 
Access & Vulnerability 
At its heart, the land reform in Lesotho is about land access. The MCC called joint titling 
for married people "an important step forward for gender equality and economic development" 
(MCC 2012). They further contended that an important element missing under the customary 
tenure regime was the ability for landholders to benefit from mortgage credit, because insecure 
tenure precluded them from borrowing against their land (MCC 2012). Access has been defined 
as "the ability to benefit from something," in this case the ability to benefit from land and land 
rights. In this, I follow Ribot and Peluso (2003), who draw a distinction between rights and 
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abilities. In short, just because a law is on the books and targeted at a certain population means 
little, without the proper execution and enforcement of that law. Simply having legal right to a 
parcel of land in no way ensures one the ability to benefit from that parcel. Further access is 
needed to be able to benefit from that land: access to markets, to labor, to inputs, to capital, 
social relations, authority and technology, among others. This is what Ribot and Peluso call the 
"structural and relational mechanisms of access." Access does not happen in a vacuum; it is 
enhanced, governed and mediated by other actors, other accesses and other relationships. 
 Land access is never merely about the land – land is a place of many values: social, 
agricultural, economic, religious, and so on. Importantly, land is not merely a place of 
agriculture. Despite that, discussions among scholars and policymakers often see it as such. 
James Ferguson said that the tendency to conflate land and agriculture illustrates  
a troubling tendency, in all of these discussions, to reduce what we might call 
the land question (who has what rights to land, what do they do with it and with 
what implications) to the agrarian question (how farming is, or ought to be, 
organized, and with what role for peasants or other small agricultural producers) 
(Ferguson 2013, 166).  
 
Access is important to Ferguson's point. To ask questions about access is to ask questions about 
people's ability to gain material benefits. As Ferguson makes clear, those benefits are not 
necessarily derived from agricultural uses of land. In fact, in the course of Lesotho's land reform, 
the MCC and the GoL rarely made any agricultural claims about the benefits that would flow to 
poor land holders. Instead, they focused on the benefits of "increased participation in the 
economy," in particular by a new ability for land holders to borrow money against a land lease. 
These material benefits were aimed at mitigating vulnerability. In the case of the MCC, that 
organization explicitly says that its goal is to reduce poverty. The GoL expressed a goal to "turn 
all land in Lesotho into an economic asset with the ultimate aim of changing the lives of all 
Basotho for the better" (Sekatle 2009).  
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The recent history of large scale development projects and women's land access in 
Lesotho is troubling. Braun (2010) investigated a compensation program for households affected 
by a major dam project. Her work found that the women's land rights were diminished by both 
the dam project and by the compensation project that followed it. Her research found that 
"devaluing of women's labour on the farms and in the households served to exclude them from 
being legitimate receivers of 'development', reproducing male ownership and patriarchal 
authority with significant implications for food security" (Braun 2010, 463). However, Braun's 
research, conducted from 1997 to 2002, predates Lesotho's recent legal innovations. Her findings 
about women's inability to legitimately receive 'development' are what government legislation 
and the MCC sought to remedy with their own development projects. MCC showed how this 
would work: those who received title were the occupants of land, and "the occupants will 
become the proprietors of an asset whose value is expected to appreciate substantially with 
formalization, and will have new incentives to invest in their homes" (MCC 2012, 5). 
 
Whose Land? Land Reform in Lesotho 
The macro-level news from Lesotho appears to be encouraging. Figure 3.1, which shows 
the gender distribution of household leases8 before and after the institution of Land Act 2010 
suggests a rousing success. Before the Act was instituted, only a handful of leases (4%) were 
jointly allocated. A large majority (73%) were held by men alone and under a quarter (23%) 
were female-held. Since the Act started governing land tenure in urban and peri-urban Lesotho, 
there has been a major shift in terms of land rights by sex. From the beginning of 2011, only 
                                                           
8 This count includes all leases that are registered by individuals or married couples, and not by churches, the state, 
companies, non-profits, and cooperatives. Those non-household leases total about one half of one percent of all 
leases issued in Lesotho. 
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14% of new leases have gone to men, while 34% have gone to women, and 52% have been 
issued to married couples jointly9. The tide of women's rights to benefit from land in Lesotho has 




Figure 3.1: Total leases issued before and after the reform project (through August 
2015) 
 
Land Act 2010 is working the way it was intended to secure women's rights to land ownership. 
Many times more plots of land are under leasehold now than before the law, and a majority of 
new leases have women's names on them (either as sole leaseholders or equal partners with their 
husbands). The law's objectives fell under the vague MCC heading of "increasing the 
                                                           
9 The seeming overrepresentation of women in receiving leases since Land Act 2010 raises questions that are beyond 
the purview of this paper, but worthy of further study. 
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participation of women in the economy" in the Compact between the MCC and Lesotho's 
government. More specifically, there were three objectives of the Act that are central to this 
paper. First, the Land Act co-operated the Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act to ensure that 
women could hold leases and inherit leases when they were the next-of-kin of a deceased 
leaseholder. Second and relatedly, those same two acts worked together to mandate that married 
couples both appear on leases, rather than just the husband10 as was the case before the Land Act. 
The third objective was spelled out by Pontšo Sekatle, the cabinet minister under whose portfolio 
the Land Act falls. In her presentation at the World Bank shortly before passage of the Act, 
Sekatle said that  
The proposed Act will be a critical tool and help us turn all land in Lesotho into 
an economic asset with the ultimate aim of changing the lives of all Basotho for 
the better. The lengthy nationwide consultative process has confirmed that 
security of tenure issue will encourage both national and foreign investors to 
develop their properties and use them as economic assets (Sekatle 2009).  
 
She then closed her presentation with an assertion about what she called the foremost objective 
of the Act, poverty reduction for the vulnerable. "Most importantly we believe that land 
registration and gender-balanced inheritance in land ownership will go a long way to secure the 
rights of poor and vulnerable groups" (Sekatle 2009). Sekatle's goals were shared with the MCC 
(MCC Compact). This paper investigates Sekatle's assertions. First, how far did the reform go to 
securing the rights of the poor and vulnerable, particularly women? Second, did the rights of the 
poor and vulnerable genuinely trump those of "national and foreign investors"? Finally, and 
critically, I examine answers to these questions through a broader temporal lens. One's ability to 
benefit from land in peri-urban Maseru in 2012 does not imply that one has the same ability in 
2016. In fact, the tools that could confer land access on the "poor and vulnerable" in 2012 may 
be the same tools used to limit or remove their access to that land in 2016. Those tools could then 
                                                           
10 Unlike in South Africa, Lesotho's only neighbor, same-sex marriage is not recognized in Lesotho as of 2015. 
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shift the ability to benefit from that land to "national and foreign investors." This is precisely 
what I will argue has happened in Ha Mohapi, a village in peri-urban Maseru. I argue that 
measurements of access, particularly those routinely used by international development agencies, 
are too short-sighted to capture the constantly shifting "structural and relational mechanisms" 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003) of access. 
 
The Gendered Outcomes of Reform in a Peri-Urban Village 
 The news from Ha Mohapi, an urbanizing village on the margins of Maseru's urban area, 
appears just as positive as the news from elsewhere in Lesotho. Ha Mohapi is technically within 
Maseru City, and it is thus subject to mandated leases for all parcels of land. The allocation of 
leases there mirrors the rest of the country. Of the leases that have been registered to households 
in Ha Mohapi (only one lease there predates 2010), 52% of them are jointly registered, 31% to 
women alone and 17% to men alone. According to the aggregate scale at which development 
agencies measure gender equity, Ha Mohapi is a success story. 
 My own field-based research in Ha Mohapi served to reinforce much of this success 
story. I interviewed the village chief, the area chief, government bureaucrats and development 
agency officials in 2012, 2013, and 2014. I also conducted in-depth (60-120 minute) interviews 
with men and women in 41 households within Ha Mohapi to investigate three main areas that 
can illuminate the gendered nature of land rights and land powers in Ha Mohapi. These three 
areas I identified from previous research to be most likely threatened in Lesotho: intra-household 
decision making about land, treatment by local authorities, and attempts at land dispossession 
(Drimie 2003, Mutangadura 2004, Eldredge 1991, Kalabamu 2006, Mphale, et al. 2002, 
Epprecht 2000, UN-HABITAT 2006, Sekatle 2009).  
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Questions on intra-household decision-making11 demonstrated that husbands make more 
decisions about land than their wives, but that household harmony was more important to most 
women than equitable decision-making. Questions about representation and treatment by local 
authorities indicated that neither the elected councilor nor the local chief was an important force 
in most Ha Mohapi residents' lives. It was another matter – that of dispossession –  that 
complicated, and perhaps even contradicted, the optimism implicit in Figure 3.1. 
A phenomenon that land titling advocates say is ameliorated by titling, but critics say is 
only exacerbated, is land dispossession. On the question of attempts to dispossess people of their 
land in Ha Mohapi, the results are ambiguous. An important gender dimension of the Land Act 
2010 was to strengthen inheritance rights for widows. The Land Act 2010 harmonized Lesotho's 
land laws with the Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act 2006, which made married women 
full citizens under Lesotho's laws, as opposed to minors under their husbands' dominion. 
Inheritance conflicts were common before passage of the Land Act 2010, and a large number 
were resolved at the expense of widows in favor of relatives who were not next-of-kin (Mphale 
2002). Limited evidence from Ha Mohapi, of three women who were recently widowed 
compared to four who were widowed before Land Act 2010, indicates that inheritance of land is 
better-protected now. None of the women whose husbands had died since 2011 expressed 
concern that her land would be taken by her husband's family. They each attributed this security, 
in part, to the legal standing of their leases. 
One informant, 'Mathabang, told me that since her husband died in 2006, other villagers 
call her a witch, and she feels "marginalized, ill-treated and not cared for. Since they know there 
                                                           
11 The interviews were semi-structured, so follow-up questions varied, but I asked husbands and wives separately 
who made decisions in their household about 1. What crops to grow, 2. What crops to sell and what to eat/use, 3. 
What to do with any money raised from sale of crops, 4. Who would decide to sell the land if they chose to do so.  
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is no adult man in this house they feel at liberty to do as they please." However, she noted that 
she was not concerned about the security of her land. Another widow told me that, after her 
husband's death, she was routinely blamed for animals grazing on other villagers' fields and 
threatened with fines or theft. These are illustrative of a success of the new land law; land is 
rarely stolen from widows. However, their vulnerability appears to persist in other ways. 
The ongoing threat to land access in Ha Mohapi appears to be not from a widow's 
opportunistic in-laws. Instead, the people of the village are under threat from a far different 
source: real estate capital, with assistance from the state. Every hectare of [what had been] Ha 
Mohapi's agricultural land has been sold since 2011, with most sales completed in 2013 or 2014. 
These purchases were at prices well below what any informant households thought was a fair 
price. Residents were approached by investment companies to negotiate the sale of their land. 
Soon it became clear that the transactions were not strictly willing buyer-willing seller sales. 
When asked why they entered into an agreement for a price that was too low, each household 
said that they felt a great deal of pressure to sell from representatives of the Maseru Municipal 
government, and those residents were warned that compensation for the land sales would arrive 
slowly for those who did not take the offered rate, or that they might be expropriated without 
compensation12. The pressure from the Municipal government illustrates an anti-democratic 
element of the reform. While the Land Act 2010 and associated other legislation were supposed 
to disempower chiefs while passing those powers to elected officials, my own research indicated 
that the elected officials are largely ceremonial, and vote as (unelected) Municipality bureaucrats 
encourage them to vote. The area that Ha Mohapi's residents have sold is planned to be a golf 
                                                           
12 Land Act 2010 sets a very low standard for expropriation by eminent domain, as defined by sections 49, 50, 51, 
and 52 of the Act. The Minister of Local Government has absolute power to declare what land is to expropriated and 
what compensation (if any) will be paid for the land. 
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course and housing development. In short, the state and investment capital appear to have 
conspired to threaten dispossession and keep sale prices low in order to hasten the passage of 
leaseholds from smallholders to developers. The people who have sold their fields are at a loss. 
With no land outside of their family homesteads, few expect (or even want) to stay in Ha Mohapi 
for much longer. Most expressed a resignation that their days in Ha Mohapi were numbered; 
soon, they told me, it would be a village for the wealthy. One informant, however, expressed an 
even starker resignation. When I asked her if she expected to one day leave the village, she said 
"And go where? There is nowhere we can go; we will stay until we die."  
 
Discussion 
 On September 17, 2013, the MCC Compact in Lesotho ended. The MCC handed over its 
remaining projects to the Lesotho government. Much of the $358 million spent on MCC-style 
development in Lesotho went largely to important infrastructure improvements. The land reform 
element of the MCC's work only accounted for about 7% of the total MCC Compact funds.  
Despite the relatively low cost, land reform may be one of the most far reaching elements 
of the Compact, because it has fundamentally altered the social relations governing land access, 
and the myriad uses and meanings that can be attached it it. The land reform has altered chiefly 
authority (as well as bureaucrats' and elected officials' authority) and the relationships between 
gender and land in Lesotho. The reverberations of these changes will be felt for many years to 
come. 
 Those many years form the crux of my main argument here. Land access is not 
necessarily transferrable or sustainable over time. Having power over land today makes it more 
likely that one will have it tomorrow, but it is not reasonable to assume that such power will 
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persist indefinitely, especially when (as in the case of Lesotho), the land tenure regime is rapidly 
changing. The MCC's methods of short-term measurement are antithetical to this understanding; 
MCC departed Lesotho in 2013 and declared its programs successes or failures then. The way 
Land Act 2010 was lived in September 2013, at least in Ha Mohapi, was much different from 
how it looked only a few months later. Leases passed to women in remarkable numbers, but that 
alone is not illustrative of substantive change in the bundle of powers that allow women to gain 
material benefits from the land. Those lease numbers demonstrate that the right to benefit from 
their land had passed to a huge number of women, but it said little of the ability to benefit. In 
fact, just as MCC was departing Lesotho, well-capitalized real estate developers, with assistance 
from the state, were beginning a process that amounted to dispossession. Those they 
dispossessed were disproportionately women, as a substantial majority of leases in Ha Mohapi 
(and Lesotho in general) have been issued to women, either alone or with their husbands. This 
points to an issue with the metrics of development; the success of a project today and the success 
of a project tomorrow are not necessarily related. In fact, when social relations are substantially 
altered by a project, as they were in Lesotho, the mechanisms of the success of a project today 
may even be its undoing tomorrow. Women in Lesotho received leases, and the potentially 
secure tenure that leases provide, in remarkable numbers. However, the ability to benefit from 
secure tenure relies on state institutions using eminent domain laws judiciously and not 
interfering by pressuring landholders to sell. In Ha Mohapi, this did not happen. As a result, 
those with the true ability to benefit from land were not the women who received leases.  
 The story of women's land access in Ha Mohapi is not meant to serve as an indictment of 
the MCC's projects in Lesotho, nor of the Lesotho Government's substantial land reform project. 
Instead, it serves as an illustration of two important things. First, the land tenure security of 
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vulnerable people, particularly women, is very easily threatened, even when it appears that 
bulwarks are in place. Especially when land rights have recently been clarified and marketized, it 
is not a surprise to see investors taking advantage of a nascent market in land. Considering the 
assistance those investors had from the state in keeping land prices low in Ha Mohapi, it is 
logical to assume that smallholder land tenure security would be threatened. Given that women 
were largely the initial beneficiaries of land titling, it is not entirely shocking that their land 
access is showing signs of being tenuous.  
This leads to the second point illustrated by Ha Mohapi. Women's ability to obtain the 
structural and relational mechanisms of access are more likely to be precarious than men. 
Women have, according to most measurements, lower social status than men in every country 
around the world (World Economic Forum 2015, UNDP 2015). The mechanisms of access are 
constantly shifting, and, especially in a landscape of rapid change where new rights and powers 
are being afforded to vulnerable people, access cannot be measured at just one point in time. In 
the case of Ha Mohapi, it appears that women's vulnerability has increased. The land from which 
they were supposed to benefit is no longer theirs, and the sale price was a fraction of its fair 
market value. Their increased vulnerability has not been captured in the MCC's data. Instead, in 
the eyes of the MCC, the story of poor and vulnerable people has been a positive one, and one 
that effectively ended in September of 2013.  
MCC's declaration of project success on September 17, 2013, is reflective of an overly 
short-term focus by development agencies. Rather than working with a 10-year, 20-year, or 
longer time horizon, agencies pay lip service to those time horizons, but rarely collect, publish, 
or learn from meaningful data on that scale. The time has come for development agencies to 
account for the years after their projects end. This is consistent with Jerven (2013, 2015) and de 
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Waal's (2016) appeals for true "evidence-based policy" (Jerven 2015). In the case of Ha Mohapi, 
heeding this call would have illustrated the limitations of Land Act 2010 to ameliorate the 
vulnerabilities the MCC and GoL targeted through the reform. The effective circumventing of 
democracy by bureaucrats and the dispossession of women, the poor, and the vulnerable (the 
exact three groups Minister Sekatle said the land reform was supposed to assist) were largely 
invisible to the MCC. This is because, though they profess to be governed by analytical rigor, the 
data are too limited. The outcomes are consistent with claims that mobilizing limited data can do 
more harm than good (de Waal 2016). In Lesotho, these data limitations have had a material 
outcome. Land reform in Ha Mohapi, and the rest of Maseru, has been declared a success by the 
MCC. This declaration of success based on limited data masks the reality. Vulnerability to 
hunger and deepening poverty appeared to have been mitigated when MCC left Lesotho and 
declared success. The limited scope of the data that allowed for the MCC to claim a successful 
outcome helped to obscure the processes ongoing in Ha Mohapi. The micro-level data discussed 
in this article indicate that an unequivocal declaration of success is, at best, an incomplete picture 
of women's land access in Maseru. 
The measurement performed by the MCC served as much to justify further MCC 
interventions as to determine policy success. Even the organization's own claims about its 
relative success were questioned by the architects of a planned second MCC-Lesotho Compact, 
who identified "poor land management allocation systems" as a "binding constraint" (LMDA 
2014) to development in Lesotho in 2014, once again claiming that ineffective allocation and 
gender inequality were abiding issues. Perhaps not coincidentally, three of the same MCC 
consultants who were intimately involved with Land Act 2010's passage are among the 




 In this paper, I have argued that the MCC, Land Act 2010 and the other contributors to 
Lesotho's land reform have failed in their stated goal of limiting the vulnerability of women and 
the poor. Instead, despite laws, development programs and data analysis aimed at changing both 
women's rights and powers to benefit from land in Lesotho, the outcomes look distressingly 
similar to pre-2010 development and land projects there. This is in spite of (and because of) the 
data and measurement focus of the MCC. The MCC's activity in Lesotho and the GoL's 
legislation both espoused a focus on mitigating the vulnerability of women and the poor. 
However, the outcomes of this research suggest that little has changed since Braun's research in 
2003, when she said of her project: 
"The research also suggests that gender must be central to the constitution and 
implementation of large-scale development projects’ mitigation policies if they 
are to contribute to food security, rather than exacerbate it, and if they are to serve 
the broader goals of reducing poverty, promoting equity, and supporting women's 
rights within their households and within societies" (Braun 2010, 462). 
 
A development project and series of reforms did little to mitigate women's vulnerability in terms 
of landholding in Lesotho. It appears that the reforms are not enough, in themselves, to forestall 
challenges to women's landholding. However, the measurement of the MCC demonstrated the 
opposite. The "broader goals" of poverty reduction and gender equity appeared achieved in 2013, 
but further investigation shows that, at least in Ha Mohapi, the achievement was merely a 




MAPPING FOR INVESTABILITY: REMAKING LAND AND MAPS IN LESOTHO 
 
Introduction 
Maps are at the center of an ongoing land reform in Lesotho13, a small and mountainous 
country of two million people in Southern Africa. The reform is focused on the urban and peri-
urban areas around Maseru, the capital, and has effectively ended customary land tenure within 
the city limits. In place of a land rights system led by chiefly allocation, the reform has 
implemented a system of leasehold titling in the Maseru area. The vast majority of these leases 
are either individual or joint leases, and they are alienable and freely exchangeable. This new 
system, which privileges "willing buyer, willing seller" [WB/WS] exchanges of land, has 
effectively done away with a customary tenure system that privileged flexibility and shared land 
use, instead creating a land market that defines land as an alienable commodity, independent of 
the chieftaincy and exchangeable on open markets. 
Southern Africa is the scene of many contested land reforms, largely because of its recent 
independence struggles and history of settler colonialism. Unlike the "populist land reform" in 
Zimbabwe (Scoones, et al. 2012), Lesotho's more closely mirrors that of its neighbor, South 
Africa, where pro-poor reform based on WB/WS tenets has been called a "failed experiment" 
(Lahiff 2007), that "will not unravel years of colonial and apartheid dispossession" (Ntsebeza 
2007, 129) and "would allow rural social relations to be undisturbed, and nationalization of 
productive economic activity would be kept to a minimum" (Bond 2002, 37). Despite a regional 
history of failure (including in Zimbabwe, where a post-independence WB/WS agenda is often 
                                                           
13 A note about word usage: Lesotho is a Southern African country, inhabited by Basotho (singular: Mosotho), 
whose language and culture are Sesotho.  
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blamed for political unrest there over the last two decades (Bond 2002; Mamdani 2009; Moyo 
2014)), Lesotho's reform falls squarely in the WB/WS camp. This is due in large part to the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the U.S. government international development 
agency that sponsored Lesotho's reform. The MCC is devoted to "poverty reduction through 
economic growth," and WB/WS reforms are consistent with this market-led development 
strategy. The MCC devoted over $20 million to the passage and implementation of Land Act 
2010, the piece of legislation that provided for leasehold titling in Lesotho.  
The legislation that legally ended customary tenure in Maseru and moved to leasehold 
titling was not new. In fact, the Land Act 2010 was nearly identical to the legislation it replaced, 
Land Act 1979.  The 2010 law succeeded where the 1979 law failed almost entirely because of a 
surveying and mapping project financed by the MCC. In 1979, there was no state or donor 
money available to pay for surveys of land parcels, but surveys were a necessary component of a 
lease application. Prior to the 2010 Land Act, anyone who wished to apply for a lease had to pay 
a surveyor to delimit the land parcel. The high costs of these services combined with the 
resistance of chiefs to the loss of their customary land allocation power resulted in little land 
titling.14 In the 2010 case, 55,000 surveys (the estimated number of plots in Maseru) were paid 
for by the MCC. This surveying project led to the creation of a cadastral map and land register, 
the first near-complete property map of Maseru in over a century, when the population was in the 
hundreds, rather than the hundreds of thousands (Ambrose 1993). In this paper, I consider the 
building of this cadastral map as illustrative of the relationships between mapping and "rendering 
land investable" (Li 2014). I argue that viewing maps' roles in rendering land investable as 
"inscription devices" ascribes alchemical powers to them; I contest that view, and propose that 
                                                           
14 Chiefs proved entrepreneurial and maintained their power by routinely backdating allocation papers to read 1978, 
effectively grandfathering those allocations into a time before leases were mandated. 
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the concept of mapping is more helpful in understanding how a cadastral map works in the world 
and helps to render land investable. In making this argument, I draw upon debates within critical 
cartography on the "power of maps" (Harley 1989, Wood and Fels 1992, Crampton 2001, 2009, 
Wood 2010, Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 2011). There is a degree of agreement in this debate about 
the "constitutive" versus the "representational" nature of maps. That is, both sides of the debate 
believe that maps have a role in producing territory. Where authors differ is on how maps do this 
work and on the (im)mutability of that work. Harley and Wood and Fels view the map itself as 
producing certain effects, like commodification, taxation, or dispossession. Kitchin and Dodge 
view the map and its effects as “context-dependent” (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 339).  For Kitchin 
and Dodge, maps “emerge in process” through technical and ideological practices “to solve 
diverse and context dependent problems” (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 340, 342, emphasis in 
original). I share their view of maps as “processual, as opposed to representational,” that emerge 
“through contingent, relational, context-embedded practices” (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 342) in 
our discussion of mapping for investability in Lesotho. 
 
Land, Cadastral Maps & Mapping 
Land is not, in and of itself, a commodity or a location of investment. It must be made so. 
In short, it must be "rendered investable." Tania Li explores this process in a paper that asks 
"What is Land?" According to Li, land is something we typically call a "natural resource," which 
"is a provisional assemblage of heterogenous elements including material substances, 
technologies, discourses and practices" (Li 2014, 589). These resources never exist in their raw 
form, but instead are always mediated by the “heterogeneous elements” that comprise them. 
Among those elements are what Li terms "inscription devices," such as axes, plows, and maps. 
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The inscription device, a term coined by Bruno Latour, is a tool or apparatus that simplifies the 
complex; these devices "can make the things they say they are talking about easily readable" 
(Latour 1983, 161).  Land titles are an example of an inscription device; they provide a readable 
solution to complex social, political, and economic problems. Titling is an effort at simplifying a 
more complicated land rights system that resists easy representation and readability. In Lesotho, 
that complex land rights system was the domain of chiefs from the colonial era until the 
execution of Land Act 2010.   
Under customary tenure, a parcel of land in rural Lesotho had many legitimate users. 
Farmers often formed partnerships with other farmers, with livestock owners in grazing 
partnerships/loans (mafisa), and worked communal land held by the chief for the common good 
(Turner 2005). Flexible land use arrangements like these, which served as a form of safety net 
for the poorest in a community, were contingent on powerful chiefs and a flexible land tenure 
regime. One scholar went as far as to say that Lesotho's existence depended on these overlapping 
land rights arrangements: "Without these sharing mechanisms, Lesotho would not have survived 
the 20th century" (Turner 2005, 1). Village chiefs have traditionally managed these multiple land 
rights systems; their power over the land also gave them power over the structure of land use and 
of labor use. In effect, the land rights system in Lesotho was qualitatively different before Land 
Act 2010 and widespread urban and peri-urban titling. Under customary allocation, land was a 
social good that had individual users, but also elements of common property; a multitude of 
people could have some type of usufruct rights to one piece of land. With the surveying, 
mapping, and lease issuing of Land Act 2010, land in Lesotho was changed. Land in Maseru lost 
its characteristic as a place of malleable tenure, where multiple users could have rights to the 
land, and a chief with local knowledge was able to allocate and limit those uses. 
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 Land is not inherently a commodity; it must be made into a good fit for exchange and 
investment. As Li phrases it, "Land’s diverse affordances make it especially challenging to 
assemble as a resource available for global investment, and yet this work is sometimes 
accomplished and investments proceed." Land commodification is achieved through a multitude 
of actors, including investors, states, technologies, etc. all helping to define a common end 
shared by those investors and states: land as commodity that can be bought and sold. Mapping is 
an inscription device that creates a condition where land can be freely exchanged. It appears 
apolitical, even as it does the work of defining land as a simplified place of measurable and 
objective characteristics, despite its social complexities. Li, following Demeritt (2001, 439) calls 
this simplification of complex phenomena into precise and measurable components "statistical 
picturing." 
Cadastral maps – maps that define precise locations, boundaries, ownership and tenure of 
property rights – are predicated on a number of assumptions. Chief among these assumptions is 
that the answer to the question "what is land" is easily enclosed within a mapped representation. 
To make a cadastral map is to remake land from the institutions and social relationships that 
create and maintain it. This map-led remaking is consistent with Li's assertion of maps as "feats 
of assembly work." In effect, this is a view of maps as both ontologically secure and prescriptive. 
Considering maps as prescriptive contrasts with the more common view that maps are essentially 
representational. Cartographic theorists from Arthur Robinson (1952) to J.B. Harley (1989) 
argued that maps are representational; that is that they demonstrate a certain truth about reality 
(as Robinson would argue) or about ideology (Harley's perspective). In contrast, Li asserts that 
maps have specific powers that do work in the world. Her view is consistent with James C. 
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Scott's explanation of a cadastral map's role as prescriptive, in that it both simplifies and alters 
reality. 
Thus a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders does not 
merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its ability 
to give its categories the force of law (Scott 1998, 3). 
 
Scott's point is crucial to the argument that maps are inscription devices; they do not only reflect 
and describe a certain reality. Maps also create a new reality that is more consistent with the 
aims of mapmakers and their sponsors. This is particularly true with the cadastral map, which 
redefines land as an economic good that is governed at the scale of the state, rather than a social 
good governed at scales far smaller and more localized such as the community (Watts 2004). The 
map, in this formulation, redefines land as a good that is transferrable. This changes the way that 
land is "socially embedded" within a given territory (Peters 2004).  
Scott's argument is echoed by that of Denis Wood and John Fels (2008), who contend that 
maps are prescriptive rather than simply descriptive. They call this the "power of the map to 
establish, almost in the religious sense" (Wood and Fels 2008, 192). Their view is a Latourian 
one consistent with Li and with Scott; the map is an inscription device: "it is for the creation and 
conveyance of authority about, and ultimately over, territory" (Wood and Fels 2008, 192). 
According to this view, maps hold an inherent power to (re)define property relations in a 
particular place. Understanding maps as prescriptive affords a certain power to them, but it is a 
view that I  believe does not offer a complete picture of the role of maps in the larger project of 
making land an exchangeable good. To say that a cadastral map is an inscription device affords 
maps an ontological security that underestimates their relational and contingent nature. I believe 
that the dynamic concept of "mapping," which I discuss below, is more helpful in understanding 
the interplay between a map and the commodification of land.  
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 Cartographic theory has turned in recent years from viewing maps as representational and 
prescriptive to a processual perspective. Kitchin and Dodge in particular propose an alternative 
“ontogenetic” theory of cartography that emphasizes mapping practices. In this perspective, there 
is no true meaning to a map; its role as prescriber or describer is insecure and shifts depending on 
the context within which it is created, viewed, or otherwise engaged with. These theorists view 
maps as "ontologically insecure" in the sense that "Maps are of-the-moment, brought into being 
through practices (embodied, social, technical), always remade every time they are engaged 
with; mapping is a process of constant reterritorialization" (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 355, 
emphasis in original). In short, any given map has no stable meaning or power in itself. Every 
map is endlessly mutable, through a process of mapping – "spatial practices enacted to solve 
relational problems" (335). The processual nature of maps keeps them from being truly 
descriptive or, as a theorist who thinks of the map as an inscription device would argue, 
prescriptive. Instead, "maps are constantly in a state of becoming; constantly being remade" 
(335). The tension between perspectives that see maps as immutable and Kitchin and Dodge's 
more relativist view is reflected in how they answer the question "what is a map?" For Scott and 
Wood and Fels, a map marks the creation of a very specific kind of reality. For Kitchin and 
Dodge, the map is emergent; it is a constantly shifting process that is constantly mutating. It is 
practices that bring maps into being and that create and recreate the meaning and utilization of a 
map. The idea of "mapping" contrasts sharply with the idea of maps as prescriptive inscription 
devices, an idea that argues that "the map is nothing more than a vehicle for the creation and 
conveying of authority about, and ultimately over, territory" (Wood and Fels 2008, 190).  
We argue that the idea of a map as nothing more than “the creation and conveyance of 
authority” over territory is far too limited an understanding of the work that the cadastral map of 
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Maseru has done. Rather, the work done by various agencies, bureaucrats, and funding bodies in 
Lesotho to create, interpret, and translate a cadastral map is more appropriately understood as a 
mapping, a series of practices that (re)make the map over and over again. 
 Cadastral mapping practices are succeeding in transforming Lesotho's land from a 
resource managed by customary chiefs into a commodity that is managed by the state and bought 
by investors. The cadastral map works to solve this major shift in resource control. It takes on an 
apparently immutable quality when it works to create property relations that result in the 
dispossession and accumulation of land, but that apparent immutability can not be taken for 
granted. At the same time, some mapping practices discussed below reveal the unstable and 
mutable quality of the cadastral map in terms of its construction, maintenance, and utilization.  I 
contend that mapping is always characterized by its mutable and immutable qualities, shifting in 
one direction or the other, depending on the circumstances that give rise to the dominance of 
certain practices over others. I also believe it is important to go beyond this oppositional debate 
and to focus on the work that maps do in society and their effects.  In order to understand how 
the cadastral map works to solve the relational problem of rendering land investable in Lesotho, I 
turn my attention in the following sections to the map’s "material substances, technologies, 
discourses and practices" (Li 2014). 
 
The Process of Mapping Maseru 
Research Site: Ha Mohapi 
In early 2014, at the beginning of my research project in peri-urban Maseru, Lesotho, I 
encountered, created, and used several maps of our study site. The research location, a village at 
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the boundary between Maseru's state-delineated urban and rural areas. is called Ha Mohapi15. Ha 
Mohapi, a community of about 700 residents, is technically within the urban area and thus 
subject to MCC-sponsored surveying project. The village's boundaries were understood and 
conveyed to us in many different ways. My first encounter with Ha Mohapi’s borders took place 
in an office of the Land Administration Authority (LAA). One official in the Survey & Mapping 
Department of the LAA showed me the state-defined limits of Ha Mohapi on his computer 
screen. The boundaries were outlined in red and superimposed on an aerial photo of the village. 
The LAA official was happy to show us this map, but apologized that he was unable to furnish 
us with either a hard or a soft copy. When I asked if we could take a smartphone picture of the 
map, the official frowned and turned his computer screen away. The second map, a mental map, 
was orally transmitted to me a few days later, when the chief of Ha Mohapi painstakingly 
described the metes and bounds of his chieftaincy. I used pencil and paper to draw the third map 
of Ha Mohapi I encountered, a crude sketch of the chief’s verbally-described boundaries. Finally, 
the chief took pity on my inability to understand his mental map and offered to walk me around 
the perimeter of the village. I gladly accepted, and pressed the "start" button on my GPS running 
watch. That night, I plugged the inexpensive watch into my computer and encountered our fourth 
map of Ha Mohapi: a Google Earth image appeared on the screen, with at least the same 
resolution as the LAA's aerial photo. Superimposed on top of it was a red line, following an 
almost-identical path to the one on the screen the LAA official had moved from his view days 
earlier. The watch created a very similar map to the LAA's official digital cadastral map of 
Lesotho because they used nearly identical technology: inexpensive GPS units that saved 
waypoints and could later be uploaded to desktop software. In effect, my watch (which currently 
                                                           
15 The name of the village has been changed to protect informant confidentiality. 
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retails for about US$70) was the equivalent of the surveying technology used by the MCC's 
consultants to delineate Maseru's property boundaries for the cadastral map.  
We conducted a total of ten months of fieldwork in Maseru in parts of 2012, 2013 and 
2014. Much of that time was spent in Ha Mohapi, where I conducted a full census of the village 
and then conducted semi-structured interviews with a representative sample (on six criteria: 
gender of household head, household size, age, tenure in the village, wealth in money, land, and 
livestock, and income) of households. Those interviews revealed the very recent loss of Ha 
Mohapi as a place of agriculture. As recently as 2012, Ha Mohapi's fields were places of 
moderate scale maize, bean and leafy green production. Households typically used most of their 
harvest for family consumption, but in good years, virtually all households reported that they 




Figure 4.1: An example of the cadastral map data: the image is from near Ha 
Mohapi. Green polygons indicate an area where a lease have been granted; red 
indicates that a lease has not yet been issued [image via Land Administration 
Authority] 
 
By 2014, none of the fields was in use. What had formerly been over 300 hectares of 
agricultural land were now dormant. The land was now set aside for two major developments, 
one for a golf course and one for a housing development. The real estate investment companies 
had formally purchased Ha Mohapi's agricultural land and the former users no longer had 
control. In the case of Ha Mohapi, the inscription device of the cadastral map caused the fields to 
cease being a place of agriculture to become a place of golf and suburban housing. 
Those maps did not simply reflect or create a reality. They were mappings that combined 
at different moments a variety of interests, technologies, and actors. Each mapping hinged on a 
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set of practices whose performance imbued each map with content and meaning. These practices 
and performances can be traced to a lineage of cartographic theory stretching from Arthur 
Robinson some 60 years ago to a number of critical cartographers today. The maps, it turned out, 
were fairly easy to make. What was more difficult to comprehend were their meanings and 
entanglements with “development” and the livelihoods of Ha Mohapi’s inhabitants. 
The simplicity and cost effectiveness of tools like our watch, and the surveying 
equipment it mirrored, has greatly eased the task of rendering land in the Maseru area investable. 
Both the watch and the survey equipment utilized so-called "differential" GPS readings, with a 
precision of roughly one meter. The era of affordable geospatial technology is a major change 
from the complicated and expensive work of surveying, mapping and recordkeeping of less than 
two decades ago, when Peter Dale, at the time the President of the International Federation of 
Surveyors, estimated the cost of a cadastral land reform at nearly half a billion dollars. "The most 
time consuming and expensive task in building a modern land administration system is the 
collection of new data and the conversion of old records into digital form" (Dale 1999, 1). A ten-
year "medium accuracy" cadastral mapping project was estimated to cost $445 million in 1999. 
Thanks to speed and relatively simplicity of geospatial technologies, a $20 million grant from the 
MCC covered the entire cost of the surveys, delineation, adjudication and mapping of the Maseru 
urban area. 
 The MCC cadastral mapping project took place in the context of a major land reform in 
Lesotho--Land Act 2010. That law and the related cadastral mapping ostensibly aim to reduce 
poverty in Lesotho by altering the relationships and institutions that govern land. This calculation 
is part of a larger theoretical belief among many scholars and development practitioners that the 
benefits of issuing titles to land will accrue to current landholders (de Soto 2000, Deininger and 
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Jin 2006). This was the contention of the MCC, which argued that "[a]ll land occupants and right 
holders will benefit from the adoption of a new land policy that improves access to land and 
security of land rights" (Millennium Challenge Corporation Lesotho Compact). 
The attempt of aid donors and the state to alter the social, political, and economic 
relationships governing land in Ha Mohapi has a history. Three decades earlier, the Land Act 
1979 created a legal basis for transforming customary holdings (chiefly allocation papers, 
commonly called a "Form C") to leases that could be bought and sold. However, a cumbersome 
bureaucratic process and the high cost of land surveying resulted in very few land transactions 
(Lawry 1993). In contrast to 30 years ago, land is now being transferred from customary to 
commercial titles with little difficulty.  This is because two of the most important elements of 
rendering land investable, the cadastral map and its close relative, the land register, can be 
constructed much faster, more cheaply, and with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. These are the 
elements that Peter Dale estimated in 1999 would cost hundreds of millions of dollars, ten years, 
and a bevy of experts to accomplish. In this paper, I argue that the combination of institutional 
reform and the use of geospatial technologies in Lesotho has made land titling and sales much 
easier.  I argue that the case of the cadastral map in rendering land investable in Lesotho 
challenges a view of maps as "inscription devices." Instead of viewing maps as "extraordinary 
feats of assembly work" (Li 2014, 593), that culminate in a finished and prescriptive product, I 
argue that it is more helpful to understand maps as processual. This idea, of mapping as process, 
is one I borrow from other cartographic theorists (Kitchin and Dodge 2007). I use data from the 
mapping, surveying, and overall reform of land in Maseru to argue that these so-called "feats" 
performed by maps in projects of land tenure reform look less like feats and more like everyday 
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social practices when mapping is seen as a dynamic and ontologically insecure process, rather 
than a static and ontologically secure one.  
 The 2010 land reform in Lesotho differed from Dale's 1999 example in three fundamental 
ways. First, and as already noted, the use of new geospatial technologies, such as GPS and GIS, 
made the process of creating a new cadastral map and land register relatively inexpensive. 
Second, MCC provided funding for the law's implementation, specifically the costs of land 
surveying and registration in the Maseru area. And third, the technocratic process of land titling 
has minimized the influence of customary chiefs who resisted the state’s land control measures 
20 years earlier. Below I explore other scholars' interpretations of mapping's contribution to the 
project of rendering land investable.  
 
Mapping Technology and Land Act 2010 
 In order to receive a lease, a landholder must produce three pieces of documentation: 
identification, an affidavit (usually from his/her chief) confirming rights to that land and a survey 
of the land by an officially recognized surveyor16. There are relatively few instances where either 
of the first two proves to be an obstacle, but the survey can be a substantial stumbling block, as it 
was in 1979. In order to ameliorate this problem, the Millennium Challenge Corporation funded 
the survey of 55,000 parcels of land in Maseru. This number represented almost the entirety of 
Maseru and represented a substantial undertaking. The MCC enlisted Kadaster, a Dutch 
government agency, to administer the project. Kadaster subsequently enlisted COWI, a Danish 
consulting company brought aboard to register 46,000 of the parcels. The remainder was to be 
completed by the Land Administration Authority (LAA). This process, of an American 
                                                           
16 As of 2014, there were fewer than ten authorized surveyors working in Lesotho, all based in Maseru. 
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government agency paying a Dutch government agency, which in turns pays a Danish consulting 
company to survey land and register leases in Lesotho, is illustrative of the number of interests 
involved in the assembly of the map. To contend that the end product is a map that prescribes 
very specific social, political, and economic relationships to territory is to assert that these 
agencies and consultants were all working towards a common prescriptive goal.  
 The work of the Americans, Dutch, Danes and Basotho was a convoluted process to build 
Lesotho's cadastral map. The data for the map are drawn from a multitude of sources. Most 
important are the database(s), aerial photography and the GIS data that make the maps legible to 
users of GIS software. These data are discussed at some length below; here I focus on the 
process and individuals involved in mapping. 
 According to the Director General of the LAA, COWI did not fulfill their obligation to 
successfully register and survey 46,000 parcels of land. They surveyed fewer than 20,000 parcels 
and, in 2012, the data were given to the LAA in a format incompatible with their main database. 
As of mid-2014, the LAA had completed the remaining 26,000 surveys, but had not yet done the 
many hours of work required to bring the surveys into a networked database that was easily 
accessible throughout the LAA's offices. 
 The database itself is a system meant to feed data into GIS software. According to the 
LAA's Survey Examination Process document, the database is directly linked to the GIS and a 
change in one should be reflected in the other. The linkage between database and GIS is 
predicated on an upgrade of that database, from Microsoft Access (a desktop database that 
allows for limited sharing among computers via server) to a "[Microsoft] SQL spatial database in 
the future as the LAA comes on line" (Survey Examination Process). The SQL database would 
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allow lease data to be more easily shared among computers within the administration via a 
central server, rather than through channels that are slow, inefficient, and easily corrupted or lost. 
As of mid-2014, the update to an SQL database had yet to happen. All the leases were 
being maintained on two external hard drives, both of which were kept in the LAA offices. The 
database is where details of all leases are kept, including the lease number, the type of lease 
(classifications include residential, commercial, agricultural, religious, etc.), the registration date, 
the land area and the location of the parcel.  
In mid-2014, the database included 40,335 records, which encompasses the entirety of 
surveys completed and leases granted to that point, excluding those performed by COWI. The 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Kadaster and COWI have all left Lesotho. The work they 
achieved, however, persists, in the form of a digital map that makes specific claims about 
property relations in Maseru. True to the assertions of scholars who contend that maps are 
inscription devices that prescribe specific understandings about territory, the cadastral map 
suggests that property rights are legible, easily readable, and investable; rather than messy and 
difficult to make accessible to investment. 
 The actors responsible for the planning, writing, passage and execution of the Land Act 
2010 are a diverse group of people from different places with different aims. A major issue with 
the way they worked was that there were different objectives and limited communication among 
them. The same can be said of the technical objects – the software and hardware that are 
intended to create a complete cadastral survey of Maseru. Land Act 2010 and the surveying and 
mapping that accompany it are social acts; the methods of surveying and mapping Maseru were 
determined and limited by the dozens of people involved in the process and the capabilities and 
limitations of the technologies they used. 
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 The Survey Examination Process handbook used by the LAA runs to 30 pages and 
includes a variety of contingency plans and workflows for situations in which changes to survey 
data need to be made (Land Act 2010 makes subdivision of land parcels a simple process, so 
these changes are likely to be common). The detailed instructions are specific to the Manifold 
System, GIS software that is similar to the more common ArcGIS, but significantly less 
expensive. Manifold, however, is currently on version 8.0, as it has been since 2008. Seven years 
is nearly an eternity in the software world and users on various message boards speculate that it 
will never have a version 9 released.  
The specifics of conducting and recording a survey are heavily detailed, and specific 
enough that many of the surveyors are minimally skilled; it is a common part time job for 
geography and planning students from the National University of Lesotho. The Lease and Survey 
Management Systems Standard Operation Procedures are a vividly detailed 35 pages that 
mirrors the process-driven and comprehensive nature of the Survey Examination Procedures. 
The survey processes are less tied to specific proprietary software than the GIS processes and 
thus much easier to conduct and complete. With the relatively wide proliferation of inexpensive 
GPS and surveying gear, the main expense of large survey projects is labor costs. The LAA's 
employees conducting surveys are largely young men working for entry-level or internship-level 
salaries. Their survey work is (by their own description) banal and rote, but their work, which 
ties their own GPS data to a cadastral survey beacon, is vitally important to the mapping of 
Maseru. The process of creating the cadastral map has been complicated and lengthy, but the 
work done has been relatively inexpensive and remarkably quick. The end result of this process 
has been to assemble a cadastral map of Maseru, which is stored on hard drives and servers at the 
LAA's offices in Maseru. This is, no doubt, an "extraordinary feat of assembly work." In the next 
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section, I consider some of the changing social, political, and economic relations that this map 
has helped alter, focusing specifically on Ha Mohapi. 
 The cadastral map has altered the socially embedded nature of land in Ha Mohapi. With 
legible leasehold land tenure and parcels neatly surveyed and recorded in a cadastre, Ha Mohapi 
is a place of commerce – land is newly investable there. Under customary land tenure, which 
existed there until 2011, land was not a commodity. Exchanges of land did exist, as did 
arrangements of sharecropping, sharing of labor, sharing of labor-saving devices, etc. However, 
those pre-2011 exchanges of land were mediated by chiefs and resistant to large-scale non-
agricultural users. Much of a chief's power was rooted in his or her ability to reallocate land 
rights in the event of disuse, death, or other reasons (Quinlan and Wallis 2003).  
 Passage of Land Act 2010, and the mapping project it set in motion, created widespread 
leasehold titling in Ha Mohapi and made the village's land a potential object of exchange. Efforts 
to make urban and peri-urban land in Maseru into a commodity had largely failed before 2010, 
as they did after the passage of Land Act 1979. Since 2010, with the MCC sponsorship that paid 
for the surveying and mapping of Maseru, land has been commodified. Every informant (with 
one exception, who believed there had simply been a minor error) with whom I spoke in Ha 
Mohapi reported that his or her property had been surveyed and every household either had 
received a lease or expected one at any moment. The cadastral map was instrumental in 
redefining land in Ha Mohapi and making it a place of potential investment. 
 That potential investment was realized very quickly. Basotho real estate developers, with 
a great deal of support from the state, took notice of Ha Mohapi's newfound legibility, 
investability, and favorable location. Two companies, one a golf course and luxury housing 
developer, the other a suburban housing developer, saw an opportunity to utilize Ha Mohapi's 
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agricultural fields for their purposes. With the help of bureaucrats from the Maseru City Council, 
these two companies used the threat of eminent domain to cajole each and every field owner into 
selling their fields for a price that every seller with whom I spoke felt to be far below market 
value. Sellers explained that they felt that dispossession without compensation (which is 
permitted at the Minister of Local Government's discretion, under the terms of Land Act 2010) 
was a real possibility, so they decided that selling for some compensation was the wisest course. 
Many sellers with whom I spoke said that they were threatened, either explicitly or implicitly, 
with dispossession by the real estate developers and by bureaucrats from the City Council. The 
exchanges of land in Ha Mohapi that were made possible by the mapping of the village were not 
Willing Seller, Willing Buyer transactions. Routine visits from representatives of the real estate 
developers, as well as the Maseru City Council, made clear to the field owners of Ha Mohapi 
that the price of R45 per square meter was not negotiable. Residents' choice was either to accept 
the R45, which was substantially below perceived market value, or run the risk of dispossession 
by the Minister of Local Government, which was a very real concern. A golf course developer 
told us that, although he "hopes it doesn't come to that," it was a very real possibility. Between 
the external pressure to sell and the discounted prices, it is difficult to see the people of Ha 
Mohapi as true "willing sellers." 
All that being said, the map did not simply convey legibility on Ha Mohapi and make in a 
place appealing to investment capital. A variety of other contingencies, including proximity to 
roads and rivers, socio-economic context, and a changing legal landscape conspired with Ha 
Mohapi's recently assembled legibility, investability, and tenure security to make it a place of 
investment. It did so despite the protestations of the country's main domestic NGO, the 
Transformation Resource Centre, the chiefs, and the Ha Mohapi landholders who did not want to 
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part with their agricultural land but felt that they had no choice. It was not simply the existence 
of a map that changed Ha Mohapi's fields into a place fit for real estate investment; it is a process 
– what Kitchin and Dodge call "mapping" – that made Ha Mohapi's appealing to real estate 
developers. This includes the institutions, laws and actors that are part of the map-making 
process; they are what make the map powerful. This constellation of forces that make a map 
meaningful is in contrast to Wood and Fels's, Scott's, or Li's conception of maps as prescriptive, 
where a map itself makes land legible, taxable, and exchangeable. The limited openness and 
contestedness of the cadastral map have kept it from the eyes of those who might object to the 
way land has been made available to investment in Lesotho: chiefs, Ha Mohapi residents and 
researchers have all seen the bureaucrat's computer screen turned away from them, either 
literally or metaphorically. In the final sections, I will explore what this means for land and the 
cadastral map of Lesotho. 
 
Discussion 
 Maps have power, but a map cannot be reduced to that power. The case of Ha Mohapi 
demonstrates some of a map’s power. The nature of that power, however, is a source of 
disagreement among scholars. Assertions that maps are prescriptive, or that they are inscription 
devices may be accurate, but they evince a limited processual understanding of mapping. Such 
assertions pay minimal attention to the constantly shifting and contested political processes that 
give the map its meaning and its power. In this paper, I concur with Kitchin and Dodge, who 
argue that a map's meaning is only derived through continually changing social, political, and 
economic processes.  
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 A map is always being assembled; it is never complete. Those who ascribe the power to 
delineate territory to the map elevate its powers above and beyond the social relationships and 
other processes that give it such power in the first place. In Lesotho, the cadastral map of Maseru 
cannot be detached from political processes like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, or from 
the very same institution that kept Land Act 1979 from being enacted, the chieftaincy. Together 
with the technologies that made the surveying, delimitation and delivery of leases in Maseru 
relatively simple and inexpensive, these political processes are a part of the assembly of the 
cadastral map. Ha Mohapi has been made into a place of economic growth; small-scale 
agricultural production has been replaced by hundreds of homes planned to cost a minimum of 
500,000 Maloti (about $37,000) each. It has been, in short, rendered investable. Remaking land 
as an alienable commodity was a goal of the reform led by Land Act 2010. However, the funding 
body, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, claimed that the benefits of investability would 
accrue to those who already occupied the land; our field research indicates that this is not the 
case, and that the fruits of Ha Mohapi's land commodification were de facto dispossession. 
Dispossession may have been the outcome of this process in Ha Mohapi, but it was (and is) not 
the only possible outcome. The cadastral map of Maseru did not prescribe state pressure, below-
market payments, or Ha Mohapi's suitability as a place to play golf. Those were social practices 
and processes. The map, however, was intimately involved with all of those processes. If the 
map is seen as a prescriptive inscription device, then it is ontologically secure, and has a very 
specific meaning. What I have demonstrated above is that mapping's relationship to rendering 
land investable is a processual and malleable one. I have shown that it is not the piece of paper 
(or GIS shapefile) that has the effect of rendering land investable. It is the processes, 
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assemblages, institutions, and actors who interact with the map that bring it into being to work in 
specific, contingent ways.  
I have a different view of maps than Wood and Fels, Scott, or Li. I have demonstrated that, in 
the case of a land reform in Lesotho, Kitchin and Dodge's view of maps as unstable and 
contingent is more helpful in explaining land alienation. In the case of Ha Mohapi, where 
residents were compelled to surrender their fields to real estate developers for discounted prices, 
the cadastral map was not doing the work of the transfer. The map was part of a constellation of 
social forces that had a hand in the dispossession of village land holders, but the map did not do 
prescriptive work; the map only operated in concert with those other forces.  
Understanding Lesotho's cadastral map as processual, rather than prescriptive, is not merely 
an academic argument. The coerced sales of fields in Ha Mohapi to serve the needs to real estate 
developers were not the only possible outcome of the cadastral mapping project there. Coercion 
was doing to work of those transfers, not the map. The pressure placed on the field sellers 
effectively precluded the mapping project from having the outcome that the MCC said was 
likely: that all land occupants would be the beneficiaries of improved security of land rights. This 
favorable view of land titling's outcomes as positive ones that accrue to the land users who are 
given initial title is shared by the MCC, World Bank and some scholars (de Soto 2000, Deininger 
and Jin 2006), but was made impossible in Ha Mohapi. The cadastral map, in a process with 
other social forces, could have created a reality of more secure tenure for individuals, but this 
was not the way those social forces remade land in Maseru.  
By emphasizing the continual social (re)construction of maps, I demonstrate that there are a 
number of possible outcomes to a mapping project. It is not the "power of maps" to dispossess 
people; the power of maps is relational and determined by people. In Ha Mohapi, I see a 
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remaking of the map, as well as a remaking of land. If the cadastral map is viewed as 
prescriptive, there would be little room for change. On the other hand, when maps are seen as 
processual and constantly remade, new avenues for change are opened up. If the external forces 
that give maps their power change, the map will change with them. To see maps as processual, 
rather than prescriptive is to leave room for a powerful feedback loop: when practices are 




This paper has explored the process of rendering Ha Mohapi's land investable via a map. 
That cadastral map demarcates land ownership and boundaries in Maseru, Lesotho. The map is 
powerful, but it is not a power that is intrinsic to the map or immutable. The cadastral map of 
Maseru does work in the world. That work, however, is not done by the map alone. It is a litany 
of other actors, relationships, and processes that (re)make the map and its work every time the 
map is engaged.  
The argument that mapping is processual, a contention drawn from critical cartography, is an 
important one. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how mapping contributes to the project of 
rendering land investable. A map's power in the project of commodifying land is immense. Maps 
help to simplify land into legible data, give landholders and potential buyers evidence of the 
durability and security of tenure the state provides, and legitimize certain claims over others. The 
process by which it does these things, and the interests whom it helps, are social and political 
decisions, made by people. Maps are vital pieces in the project of rendering land investable, but 
the manner in which they commodify land and the interests they served are determined by social, 
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political, and economic decisions. Scholars who call maps "inscription devices" elide this fact 
and effectively close off other potential uses of a map. This chapter demonstrates that maps are 
only powerful in concert with other social forces. There are a multitude of ways in which a map 
can do work, depending upon the forces that imbue it with power. 
In the case of Ha Mohapi, I have illustrated that simply calling a cadastral map an 
"inscription device" is too static to fully capture its role in the project of commodifying land. 
Instead, this view needs to be made more dynamic to explain the larger processes at work in land 
commodification. A map does work in the world, but not alone. It is only with bureaucrats, real 
estate developers, the MCC, and dozens of other actors that a map does its work. This social and 
relational understanding of maps as ontologically insecure is more helpful in understanding how 









 The relationship between macroeconomic growth and poverty reduction is an ambiguous 
one. It is certainly not as cut-and-dried as the Millennium Challenge Corporation makes it sound 
when MCC claims that poverty reduction necessarily flows from economic growth. A growing 
body of literature contends that "growth by itself is not necessarily sufficient. It needs to be 
sustainable, sustained and inclusive" (McKay and Sumner 2008, 2). From the International Labor 
Organization (Islam 2004) to the World Bank (2013), the idea that growth is a sufficient 
condition to reduce poverty has been challenged. In fact, even the assertion that growth is a 
necessary condition for poverty reduction has been questioned (Ferreira, et al. 2009).  
 Despite the limited empirical evidence linking poverty reduction and economic growth, 
development agencies, consultants, and states have advocated and adopted policies predicated on 
that link. This dissertation has investigated one major element of the MCC's claim that economic 
growth leads to poverty reduction: land reform. The MCC is often vague in explaining the 
mechanism by which land reform will create poverty reduction, with the most explicit claim 
being a broad generalization.  
 
"Improvements in [land] tenure security also favor growth that is 'pro-poor' 
because the benefits generally accrue to those who have not possessed such rights 
in the past and those who are affected most by high property registration costs" 
(MCC.gov).  
 
This dissertation was motivated by a search for the other claims that drove and followed from the 
MCC's "pro-poor" claim about its land rights development policies. Specifically, I was interested 
in the novelty of the MCC. Was this truly, as George W. Bush had proclaimed, a "new compact 
for global development" (Bush 2002)? Or was it just a continuation of the land policies of the 
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Washington Consensus? A second, more micro-level interest, was in the results of Lesotho's land 
reform. Was women's land access enhanced by the reform, and how was their access monitored 
and evaluated by the MCC? A third question was inspired by Lesotho's use of the majority of the 
$20 million of land reform. What part did cadastral mapping play in the project of rendering 
Lesotho's land investable, and what does that reveal about the relationship between land 
commodification and maps? 
 My research project addressed these questions in three empirical chapters. In chapter 2, I 
explored the post-2000 development agenda, which I term the "PRSP [Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper] Era." Using Lesotho's land reform as a lens, I argue that there is substantially 
less originality in the PRSP era than its advocates have claimed. Instead of major change, the 
land reforms of the PRSP era, advocated by MCC and others, bear a very strong resemblance to 
the land reforms of the Washington Consensus era, and before. The logics – of economic growth 
and trickle down economics – seem much the same as in the past, and the outcomes are not 
dissimilar. A novelty is that development agencies' assertions about how land reform causes 
economic growth have changed. Instead of improved agricultural yields, MCC stressed the 
ability to borrow against one's home/land equity in Lesotho as the benefit for landholders. This 
stress of the speculative value of one's property was a substantial change in land rights and 
development. I argue that it created the conditions for a de facto dispossession in Ha Mohapi, 
Lesotho. I termed this, the conditions for dispossession being created by a development agency, 
"development by dispossession."  
 In Chapter 3, I examined what "data driven" development projects look like. Lesotho's 
land reform sought to create (or bulwark) the conditions for women's equitable land access there. 
The research demonstrates a shortcoming of the MCC's data driven development. Its 
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measurement time horizon in Ha Mohapi was too short term to capture the gendered reality of 
dispossession there. Instead of long term measurement that would have highlighted how tenuous 
women's land access in Ha Mohapi was, the MCC effectively declared success when its compact 
ended. Shortly after that declaration of success, the fields that provided livelihoods for many of 
the village's new leaseholders were sold at below-market prices. I use these facts to argue that 
conceptions of access and data must be broadened.  
 Lastly, Chapter 4 explores the role of surveying and cadastral mapping in Lesotho's land 
reform. The surveying was funded largely by the MCC, and the lack of surveys was the missing 
element from the previous effort at market-led land reform in Lesotho. In this chapter, I use the 
larger story of Ha Mohapi to contend that the role of maps in the project of rendering Lesotho's 
land investable is not merely as "inscription devices." That conception, I argue, is limited and 
ascribes to maps a power that they do not inherently possess. Instead, it is social, political, 
cultural, and economic forces that (re)create and (re)use the map to give it certain powers. Maps 
are never complete and are their meanings are constantly shifting while being assembled and 
reassembled. I showed that this was the case by demonstrating the constellation of social forces 
that give the cadastral map of Lesotho its power to render land investable; the map itself does not 
possession such alchemical power.  
 In summary, the chapters make three key contributions. The broad literature of 
development and land rights in Africa is strengthened by my analysis of the limited changes in 
the way development and land reforms operate in the PRSP era versus the ones that came before. 
There are avenues for further study in terms of other development foci, like health and education: 
do these interventions look the same as before in this "new compact"? The investigation of 
development and dispossession also contributes to the accumulation by dispossession literature, 
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demonstrating the combined economic and extra-economic justifications made in the name of 
"development." Second, this study makes a contribution to the literatures on land access and 
measurement. By bringing access and development measurement together, I demonstrate that 
time is an important element of both: access today does not necessarily confer access tomorrow. 
There are important policy implications to this, especially in an era of enormous monitoring and 
evaluation operations within the development industry. Third, this project explored the roles that 
maps play in the project of rendering land investable. Rather than viewing maps as ontologically 
secure, I follow cartographic theorists who have pointed to the insecurity and mutability of a 
map's meaning. This encourages those who study the power of maps to understand the power 
relations underpinning a map's meaning at any given moment, rather than ascribing certain 
inherent powers to the map itself.  An additional avenue for further study is deeper ethnographic 
research within Ha Mohapi: what characteristics shape whether an individual or household is 
likely to lose or keep their land? It is clear that both class and gender are important factors, but 
those are not likely to be an exhaustive list. Further study will illuminate the characteristics that 
shape the land access of people in Ha Mohapi. This work will expand upon the gendered nature 
of dispossession. The data I collected for this dissertation have demonstrated that land reform is 
leading to gendered dispossession and gendered proletarianization in Ha Mohapi. However, it 
appears that the peri-urban dispossessed are likely to depart for rural areas, while the 
proletarianized population who work in newly-constructed factors are themselves typically 
migrants from the rural areas. This is a complication of simple understandings of primitive 
accumulation and the making of peasants into wage laborers. I am eager to embark on further 
research about this to explore and explain the complicated and gendered processes of 
accumulation, dispossession, and proletarianization in Lesotho. 
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 Finally, I hope to explore the work of the Millennium Challenge Corporation beyond 
Lesotho. Their development projects extend beyond Lesotho; the MCC is involved in land 
reforms in twelve countries in Africa. MCC makes many data publicly available and open for 
public analysis. I look forward to exploring these data both to draw conclusions and to help plan 
and situate further research into their development claims on the continent. 
 The land reform in Lesotho that began in 2010 echoes the past in many ways. It is 
markedly similar to the 1979 effort at reform, and it seems less like a bold "new compact" in 
development than repetition of what has come before. However, there are important novel and 
interesting elements to it. Through this dissertation, I have explored what the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation's conceptions of poverty reduction and economic growth have meant for 
land access within the mountain kingdom of Lesotho. To reiterate a caveat from chapter 4, here I 
would like to reiterate that this dissertation is in no way meant to be an indictment of the work 
done by MCC; their "infrastructure improvements are ubiquitous throughout the country" and a 
majority of their "work has focused on fairly unimpeachable water and health infrastructure 
projects" (Aerni-Flessner and Fogelman 2016). However, despite a preponderance of good, it is 
important to acknowledge and understand the shortcomings, failings, and unintended 
consequences of development projects. For the sake of Basotho, Americans, and anyone who has 
been or will be impacted by land reform, a holistic understanding of Lesotho's land reform leaves 
open the possibility of genuinely pro-poor land reform that positions poverty reduction front-
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